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INTRODUCTION
Seldom, if ever, have the power and the purposes of
legislation been rendered so impotent .... All that is left
today are afew scattered remnants of a once grandiose
scheme to nationalize the fundamental rights of the
individual.'
Few areas of the law can inspire the fury of popular debate, the
breadth of scholarly criticism, the intensity of research, or the
multitude of legislative enactments and judicial interpretations to
parallel the controversy surrounding the precise meaning of equality
and civil rights in the American workplace. The struggle for civil
rights, still firmly etched in America's collective consciousness,
officially admitted a new member with the passage of the Americans
1. Eugene Gressrnan, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
Mich. L. Rev. 1323, 1323, 1343 (1952).
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with Disabilities Act2 (ADA) in 1990. Its mandate has proven
anything but clear. Since its enactment, the contours of the ADA
have been subject to continual examination, and the Supreme Court
has heard an unusually heavy load of disability rights cases.' Recent
commentators have characterized many interpretations of the ADA
as a "backlash" against the statute.4 This backlash is attributed to a
myriad of different causes, ranging from judicial intolerance of the
Act's objectives to media portrayals that misunderstand the
underpinnings and scope of the Act.5 One commenting Justice
attributes the endless judicial examination of the ADA to
uncertainties and ambiguities inherent in the statute.6 Regardless of
its cause, however, one thing is certain: the ADA is producing
considerable confusion.
In 2002, the confusion generated by the ADA was more evident
than ever before. Justice O'Connor suggested that the Court's 2002
term will likely be remembered as the "Disabilities Act Term"7 for
the high number of cases dealing with this "landmark civil rights"
enactment. The "Disabilities Act Term" included four cases: (1) US
Airways, Incorporated v. Barnett' (2) Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
3. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor attributes this to gaps in the
law: "It's an example of what happens when... the sponsors are so eager to get
something passed that what passes hasn't been as carefully written as a group of law
professors might put together... This act is one of those that did leave uncertainties
in what it was Congress had in mind." NAMI Update (National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill, Santa Cruz, CA), O'Connor: Disabilities Act Has Gaps, available at
http://www.namiscc.org/newslettersFebruaryO2/DisabilityActGaps.htmn (last visited
Sept. 12, 2003). The confusion generated by the ADA may also be attributable to
its reliance on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, an Act that, since it did not create
private rights of action, did not produce much litigation. As a result, the major
contours of a more expansive civil rights approach to disability discrimination have
only recently been investigated.
4. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 3-4 (2000); Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis,
Lumber Lung and Juggler's Despair: The Portrayal of the Americans with
Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 Berkeley J. Ernp. & Lab. L. 223
(2000).
5. See id.
6. NAMI Update (National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Santa Cruz, CA),
O'Connor: Disabilities Act Has Gaps, available at
http://www.namiscc.org/newsletters/February02/DisabilityActGaps.htm (last
visited Sept. 12, 2003).
7. Id.
8. 535 U.S. 391, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002) (holding that the ADA does not
usually require an employer making job assignments to deviate from a legitimate
seniority system even when the system is not part of a collective bargaining
agreement).
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Kentucky v. Williams,9 (3) Barnes v. Gorman,1 ° and (4) Chevron
US.A. Incorporated v. Echazabal. "
This note uses the last of these cases, Echazabal, to illustrate
fundamental flaws inherent in Congress's approach to disability
discrimination in the workplace. The Echazabal decision stands for
the proposition that an employer is free to exclude a disabled
applicant or employee from a position that would place him in certain
danger. 2  Using several lenses, including social science,
discrimination theory, and history, this piece examines the
implications of this unanimous decision, and argues for a modified
approach to disability discrimination in the workplace that would
incorporate lessons learned in the context of other protected groups.
Part I offers a brief overview of the process leading up to the
passage of the ADA and the substantive provisions thereof. Part II
discusses the Echazabal decision and the divergent approaches to
self-harm taken by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court respectively. Part 11(A) examines the
implications of this opinion; particularly, the distinction, announced
by the Supreme Court, between individualized risk assessments made
pursuant to the ADA's direct threat provision, and "paternalistic
judgments based on the broad category of gender," which are
forbidden in the Title VII context. 3 This note attributes the Supreme
Court's decision in Echazabal to the ADA's confusing combination
of paternalistic notions of inherent vulnerabilities with the rhetoric of
previous civil rights enactments that purport to grant equality.
Following a discussion of the stubbornly persistent historical
paternalism evident in the ADA, part Il1(B) examines an alternative
approach to biological variance that arose during the women's
equality movement. During this examination, special attention is
9. 534 U.S. 184, 196, 122 S. Ct. 681, 691 (2002) (holding that key terms in
the ADA's definition of an actual disability "need to be interpreted strictly to create
a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled").
10. 536 U.S. 181, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002) (holding that punitive damages are
not available to private plaintiffs suing under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
§ 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
11. 536 U.S. 73, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (unanimously upholding an EEOC
regulation that allowed an employer to refuse to hire an otherwise qualified
individual if, by virtue of his disability, the employment posed a direct threat to the
disabled individual's own health or safety).
12. Id. at 86, 122 S. Ct. at 2053.
13. Id. at 86 n.5, 122 S. Ct. at 2053 n.5, citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977); International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). InEchazabal, the Court stated that Title VII
is generally concerned with "paternalistic judgments based on the broad category
of gender, while the EEOC has required that judgments based on the direct threat
provision be made on the basis of individualized risk assessments." 536 U.S. at 86
n.5, 122 S. Ct. at 2053 n.5.
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devoted to the argument that the ADA and Title VII, which are
popularly understood to require accommodation and
antidiscrimination respectively, embody profoundly different
antidiscrimination models. Building on Professor Jolls's
provocative thesis in this regard-which asserts that the categories
of antidiscrimination and accommodation are actually overlapping
rather than conceptually distinct' 4-part IV(A) extends this
understanding to propose a revision of the ADA that would
incorporate lessons learned from Title VII. Part IV(B) then seeks
to explore an alternative argument that questions the propriety of
dispensing with the "conventional wisdom" attacked by Professor
Jolls. Drawing on arguments recently propounded by Professor
Verkerke," this section examines the
antidiscrimination/accommodation distinction in light of normative
considerations of the proper scope of civil rights law, and concludes
that meaningful distinctions between the two categories are possible
and consequential. This section extends Professor Verkerke's
research further, however, to argue that the true distinction between
antidiscrimination and accommodationist provisions relate to
principle, and not merely cost. The paper concludes by illustrating
the unintended consequences of expansively drafted
accommodationist provisions and offers an alternative reform that
would align the ADA more closely with "traditional"
antidiscrimination mandates.
At the outset, the author concedes that the two revisions
proposed in part IV of this note represent opposite and mutually
exclusive extremes on the spectrum of potential legislative reforms
of the ADA. Hence, they are best understood as an "either/or"
proposition: either Congress must provide a clearer, stronger, and
more definitive accommodation mandate (and legislatively
safeguard the statute from predictable judicial resistance), or
Congress must align the ADA more closely with previous, more
"traditional," antidiscrimination mandates. Ultimately, the
"backlash" against the ADA has all but destroyed the statute as a
litigation tool.' 6 Given the serious consequences of judicial
resistance to core elements of the statute, the unifying central theme
of the proposals presented in this note is consistent: major (and
potentially extreme) revisions of the ADA are imminently
necessary.
14. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination andAccommodation, 115 Harv. L. Rev.
642, 645 (2001) [hereinafter "Jolls"].
15. J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and Accommodation,
44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1385 (2003) [hereinafter "Verkerke"].
16. See infra, text accompanying notes 23 & 24, and the sources cited therein.
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I. TRIUMPH OR TRAGEDY?: THE HISTORY AND MAKING OF THE
ADA
A. A Most Unlikely Marriage
In the midst of a Republican administration tenaciously pursuing
deregulation and limitations on the cost of government, the most
unlikely of marriages transpired: a "landmark" in the arena of civil
rights legislation received unprecedented bipartisan support in
Congress. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,"7 termed the
"most sweeping civil rights legislation in a generation,"'" sailed
through Congress by an overwhelming majority and received the
active support and cooperation of the Bush Administration. 9
Sponsors described the ADA as a "long-overdue 'emancipation
proclamation' for the disabled," 0 and proponents held high hopes that
the legislation would usher in a new era of changing attitudes and
perceptions comparable to that succeeding antidiscrimination laws
affecting race and gender.2' President Bush evoked images of the fall
of the Berlin Wall, which had occurred the year before, when he
announced that the ADA took "a sledgehammer to [the] wall...
which has, for too many generations, separated [disabled] Americans
from the freedom they could glimpse, but not grasp...,. Let the
shameful wall of exclusion finally come tumbling down. 22 Such
starry-eyed visions would be short-lived, however, as reports indicate
17. 42 U.S-C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
18. Glen Elsasser, Senate OKs Rights Billfor Disabled, Chicago Tribune, Sept.
8, 1989, at 1.
19. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 27, 30 & n.2 (2002) [hereinafter "McGowan"].
This support is even more astonishing when compared with the Bush
Administration's treatment of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, which
President Bush vetoed, calling it a "quota bill." See Roger Clegg, Introduction: A
Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 La. L. Rev. 1459
(1994).
20. Helen Dewar, Senate Approves Disabled Rights Bill: Bush Expected to
Sign Landmark Legislation, The Washington Post, July 14, 1990, at Al.
21. See G. Phelan & J. Atherton, Disability Discrimination in the Workplace
§ 1.07 (1997) (stating that "[t]wenty-six years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
our nation has conferred upon people with disabilities the same protections afforded
other minorities and women."). This general sentiment is further reflected by the
statement, in a House Committee Report, that "the Americans with Disabilities Act
completes the circle begun in 1973 with respect to persons with disabilities by
extending to them the same civil rights protections provided to women and
minorities beginning'in 1964." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 26 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449.
22. National Council on Disability, Equality of Opportunity: The Making ofthe
Americans with Disabilities Act at 179-80 (1997) [hereinafter "National Council
on Disability"].
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that well over 90 percent of ADA plaintiffs fail at the summary
judgment stage,23  and disability advocates balk at judicial
interpretations which cripple the once-heralded enactment.24 Before
examining possible reasons for this phenomenon, it is necessary to
first understand the justifications and findings that led Congress to
enact the ADA.
B. An Enticing Vision: The Objectives Underlying the Design and
Promulgation of the ADA
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 upon determining that the
approximately 43 million disabled Americans comprise "a discrete
and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of [their] individual ability . . . to participate in, and
contribute to, society."'22 The discrimination sought to be corrected
often took the form of "intentional exclusion, the discriminatory
effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers,
overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to
23. A recent survey conducted by the American Bar Association found that a
significant percentage of ADA discrimination claims are dismissed on summary
judgment because plaintiffs cannot prove the prima facie elements, which include
disabled status. The survey also revealed that in cases in which one party clearly
prevailed, 92% ofjudicial decisions favored defendants. See Study Finds Employers
Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 Mental &
Physical Disability Law Reporter (ABA Comm'n on the Mentally Disabled) 403,
403-05 (1998). Additionally, Ohio State Law Professor Ruth Colker recently
published an even more comprehensive two-part study of outcomes in federal
district and appellate ADA Title I decisions. Her findings revealed that of those
cases included in the appeals court data set defendants had prevailed at the trial
court level 94% of the time. Of those 94%, defendants prevailed on appeal 84% of
the time. Of the remaining 6% of district court cases in which plaintiffs had
prevailed, 48%, were reversed in defendants' favor on appeal. See Ruth Colker, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 99 (1999).
24. See, e.g., Alison Barnes, Envisioning a Future for Age and Disability
Discrimination Claims, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 263,264 (2002) ("Altogether, the
ideals and optimism represented by [the ADA and ADEA] have given way to
political forces that favor deregulated business interests and diminished individual
rights."); Diane L. Kimberlin and Linda Ottinger Headley, ADA Overview and
Update: What has the Supreme Court Done to Disability Law?, 19 Rev. Litig. 579,
581-82 (2000) ("Court decisions since the ADA's passage . . . have created the
perception that employers will usually prevail in ADA lawsuits and that employees
have little chance of successfully establishing disability discrimination.").
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
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existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards
and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs,
activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities. 26 The legislative
goals were to "assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency."27 In this way, the
Act provided an enticing vision of equal opportunity for all
Americans, while simultaneously reducing the unnecessary expenses
concomitant to dependency and nonproductivity.28 At the Republican
Convention in 1988, President Bush declared, "I am going to do
whatever it takes to make sure the disabled are included in the
mainstream. For too long, they have been left out, but they are not
going to be left out anymore." 2' The ADA sought to make this vision
a reality with sweeping provisions and broad language aimed at
addressing the wide range of difficulties, and eliminating many of the
barriers, preventing the disabled from full participation in everyday
life.
C. Translating Vision Into Reality: An Overview of the Substantive
Provisions of the ADA
The ADA is codified under three substantive titles,3" each
designed to address distinct obstacles faced by individuals with
disabilities. Title I prohibits disability discrimination in employment31
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. 12101(b) (2000)
(discussing the legislative purpose of the ADA).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (2000).
29. National Council on Disability, supra note 22, at 84.
30. Title II of the ADA bans discrimination in state and local government
programs (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000)), while Title III does the same
with respect to private entities offering commercial facilities and providing places
ofpublic accommodation (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000)). Title IV contains
miscellaneous enforcement provisions and exemptions (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-
12213 (2000)).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000). In addition to the guidance provided
in the text of the Act, the ADA delegates regulatory and enforcement authority over
Title I to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12116 (2000). Pursuant to this grant of authority, the commission has
promulgated formal regulations defining and illustrating the substantive provisions
of the Act, as well as several interpretive guides and manuals. The formal EEOC
regulations addressing Title I are codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-.16 (2002). The
commission also promulgated interpretive guidance at 29 C.F.R. app. § § 1630.1-. 16
(2002). Unlike regulations, interpretive guidelines are not promulgated according
to formal notice and comment procedures, and, hence, do not generally receive the
same level of judicial deference as regulations. An EEOC technical assistance
manual addressing the provisions of Title I [Equal Opportunity Commission, A
Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (1992)] is also available at http://www.ada-
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and serves as the focus for this comment. With the exclusion of the
federal government and private membership clubs, Title I of the ADA
applies to those entities employing fifteen or more employees. The Act
prohibits a covered entity from discriminating against a qualified
individual with a disability because of his disability in regard to all
terms, conditions, and privileges ofemployment.32 The Act specifically
describes a broad array of actions constituting discrimination such as
denying a qualified individual with a disability a reasonable
accommodation 33 or using standards or criteria "that have the effect of
discrimination on the basis of a disability. '34 In this catalogue of
proscribed discriminatory conduct, however, the ADA transcends
previous prohibitions on discrimination 3 by inserting an affirmative
duty, on the part of employers, to make "reasonable accommodations
to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability."36 Hence, in order to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that he or she has a disability
within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he or she is qualified, or able,
to perform the essential functions of the position with or without
reasonable accommodation; and (3) that the employer took an adverse
employment action against him or her in whole or in part because of the
protected disability. The majority of litigation has focused on defining
the terms "disability," "qualified individual," and "reasonable
accommodation," as well as outlining the contours of available
employer defenses.
An individual is considered to have a disability under the ADA in
three separate instances: (1) if he or she has a "physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
infonet.org/documents/titleI/titleI.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2003). See also,
Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/acconmodation.html (last visited Sept 12, 2003), for
a detailed analysis of ADA provisions.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2000) for
a complete listing of the proscribed discrimination.
34. 42 U.S.C.§ 12112(b)(3)(A).
35. Title VII does include an explicit duty to provide reasonable
accommodation where religion is concerned, however, this has been interpreted
very restrictively. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 S.
Ct. 2264 (1977); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 107 S. Ct. 367
(1986). Professor Christine Jolls, in Antidiscrimination and Accommodation,
argues that other antidiscrimination mandates applying to race and sex can,
likewise, be classified as accommodation mandates because they impose similar
costs on employers. See Jolls, supra note 14. For further discussion of this topic see
infra text accompanying notes 188-198.
36. 42 U.S.C.§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
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activities of such individual;" (2) if he or she has a "record of' having
such a physical or mental impairment; or (3) if he or she is "regarded
as" having such an impairment.37 Under the first category of covered
disabilities a plaintiff must establish three things: (1) he or she has a
physical or mental impairment; 38 (2) the impairment affects his or her
ability to perform a "major life activity;" and (3) the limitation is
"substantial." '4 The second and third categories of protected
disabilities under the ADA, i.e. the "record of' and "regarded as"
definitions, protect those individuals who may not have a covered
physical or mental impairment from being treated by employers as if
they did. Persons who previously suffered from a covered
impairment, or who were wrongly classified as having such an
impairment, frequently fall into the category of individuals having a
"record of' such impairments. The ADA's protection of persons
"regarded as" having a covered impairment includes individuals
whose impairments do not substantially limit a major life activity, but
who are treated by employers as having such limitations. This
language would also encompass those individuals who are impaired
solely by the attitude of others toward such impairments.4
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12102; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (2000), 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(g)(2-3) (2000), 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2000) ("Has a record of such
impairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."), 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1-3) (2000) ("Is regarded as having such an impairment means:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) Has
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only
as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) Has none of the
impairments defined in paragraphs (h) (1) or (2) of this section but is treated by a
covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.").
38. The EEOC regulations define the terms "physical or mental impairment"
to encompass virtually any physiological or psychological disorder. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h)(1-2) (2000).
39. Like its ancestor statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
112, 87 Stat. 355, the ADA defines "major life activities" as "functions such as
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
reading, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2000).
40. An individual is "substantially limited" if he or she is unable to perform, or
is significantly restricted (as compared with other individuals) in the performance
of, a major life activity that the average person in the general population can
perform. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1)(i-ii) (2000). Factors influencing a determination
of substantial limitation include the nature and severity ofthe impairment, how long
the impairment is expected to last, and whether the impairment may be
characterized as permanent or long-term. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (2002).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1). The Supreme Court explained the rationale for
this standard in Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, when it stated that
"society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment." 480
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Regardless of disabled status, the ADA only prevents an employer
from discriminating against a "qualified" worker with a disability.42
The idea of "reasonable accommodation" factors into the meaning of
a "qualified individual with a disability," which includes persons who
can, "with or without reasonable accommodation," perform the
essential functions of the job in question.43 Each and every person
who is a qualified individual with a disability is entitled to reasonable
accommodation under the ADA. Although the cost may not always
be de minimis,44 if the accommodation is "reasonable" it is mandated
by the Act and, hence, must be provided by the employer.45 The
accommodation duty is balanced by the provision that it must not
create an "undue hardship" for the employer. An employer's "undue
U.S. 273, 284, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1129 (1987). See also EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines,
923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (employer's refusal to hire obese job applicant
based on assumptions about impaired mobility not derived from objective medical
testings or findings violated the antidiscrimination mandate of the ADA); Riemer
v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 148 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasonable juror could
find that discrimination against employee based on an asthma condition regarded
by employer as substantially limiting the major life activity ofbreathing violated the
ADA); E.E.O.C. v. Joslyn Mfg. Co., 5 A.D. Cas. 1220 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (punch press
operator with record of carpel tunnel syndrome overcame summary judgment and
was entitled to a trial on whether his perceived impairment substantially limited his
ability to work).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). The ADA states that "consideration shall be
given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of ajob are essential, and if
an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job." Id. The EEOC regulations set up a two-step analysis for
determining whether an individual is qualified: (1) the individual must satisfy the
prerequisites of the position, such as possessing the appropriate educational
background, employment experience, skills, and licenses, and (2) the individual
must be able to perform the essential functions of the desired position once a
reasonable accommodation is provided. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m) (2002).
44. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630(p) (2000). The de minimis standard was applied to
cases of religious discrimination under Title VII. Under this approach, any
accommodation that requires the employer to incur more than a slight cost would
likely constitute an undue hardship. Congress specifically rejected the de minimis
standard in the context of the ADA. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990);
see also, Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512 (2d Cir. 1995) (cost of parking
spaces for disabled Legal Aid attorney may be a reasonable accommodation,
although possibly costing as much as $520 per month).
45. While not specifically defined, the statute does list possible
accommodations, including: "(A) making existing facilities used by employees
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(9)(A)-(B) (2000).
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hardship" arises if the accommodation requires "significant difficulty
or expense," when considered in light of factors such as the
employer's size, financial resources, and the nature and structure of
its operation. 6 Hence, the terms "reasonable accommodation,"
"qualified individual," and "undue hardship" are interdependent and
entangled, rendering them nearly impossible to categorize neatly or
define separately.47 An individual is qualified only if he can perform
the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and an
accommodation is reasonable only if it does not pose an undue
hardship.
Once a plaintiff satisfies the three prima facie elements-
disability, qualification, and adverse employment decision because
of a disability- n employer has several available mechanisms for
defending against claims of disability discrimination. Section
12113(a) of the ADA provides a defense for employment
qualification standards "shown to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity," although their effect is to exclude persons with
disabilities, provided that "such performance cannot be accomplished
by reasonable accommodation." ' 8  This defense is termed the
"business necessity defense." The ADA states that the term,
'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace." '49 Hence, an employer may also defend
against discrimination claims by arguing that the disabled individual
poses a "significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot
be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." The latter defense,
termed the "direct threat defense,"'" is considerably narrow as
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000). The EEOC regulations state that an
accommodation poses an "undue hardship" if it would be "unduly costly, extensive,
substantial, disruptive, or... would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of
the business." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (2000).
47. See generally, Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: The Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent,
14 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 201 (1993).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000). "The term 'qualification standards' may
include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health
or safety of other individuals in the workplace." Id. at § 12113(b).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2000).
51. For an overview of the origin and meaning of the direct threat defense see
Ann Hubbard, Understanding and Implementing the ADA 's Direct Threat Defense,
95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1279, 1298 (2001); see also Amanda J. Wong, Distinguishing
Speculative and SubstantialRisk in the Presymptomatic Job Applicant: Interpreting
the Interpretation of The Americans With Disabilities Act Direct Threat Defense,
47 UCLA L. Rev. 1135, 1143-1156 (2000) (discussing policy concerns underlying
the direct threat defense and the EEOC interpretation allowing for direct threat-to-
self as a defense to liability under the ADA).
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outlined in the text of the ADA: only significant health or safety risks
warrant an adverse employment decision and, even then, only when
the risks cannot be mitigated by reasonable accommodation.52 The
EEOC regulations, however, advance this defense a step further to
include significant threats to the health or safety of the disabled
individual himself.13  The regulations mandate that such
determinations be based on "individualized assessments" of the
disabled person's ability to safely perform the essential functions of
the job, which, in turn, should be predicated on reasonable medical
judgments relying on the most current medical knowledge and/or best
available objective evidence.54 Disability advocates and numerous
commentators criticized the EEOC's inclusion of self-harm as flying
in the face of an obvious Congressional intent to do away with
overprotective, paternalistic employment practices." However, the
52. There has been considerable debate regarding whether the business
necessity and direct threat defenses should be understood to operate in tandem or
as completely separate standards. The EEOC Interpretive Guidance states that
"[w]ith regard to safety requirements that screen out or tend to screen out an
individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities, an employer
must demonstrate that the requirement, as applied to the individual, satisfies the
'direct threat' standard in § 1630.2(r) in order to show that the requirement is job
related and consistent with business necessity." 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. §§
1630.15(b), 1630.15(c) (2000); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (requiring that
selection criteria that screen out persons with disabilities, including "safety
requirements," must be job-related, consistent with business necessity, and not
amenable to reasonable accommodation); E.E.O.C. v. Exxon Corp., 1 F. Supp. 2d
635, 642 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (finding that applying the generic "business necessity"
test to safety qualifications would "arguably render the direct threat test
superfluous"), rev'd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000); but see
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002)
(interpreting the direct threat defense as a smaller subpart, or illustration, of the
more expansive defense of business necessity).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2000) ("Direct Threat means a significant risk of
substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.") (emphasis added).
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Factors to be considered when making this
individualized risk assessment include: "(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature
and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will
occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm." Id.
55. Congressional intent is a troublesome and often indiscernible concept. For
example, the appendix to the EEOC regulations cite a Senate report (29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(r), citing S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 56 (1989)), a House Judiciary
Committee report (Id., citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45-46 (1990)), and
a House Labor Committee report (Id., citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485. pt. 2, at 56-57
(1990)) in support of its interpretation of the direct threat defense as including self-
harm. Commentators criticizing the EEOC interpretation find ample support for
their position in the legislative history as well. See, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-
596, at 57, 60, 77, 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 566, 569, 586,
593; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 34, 45-46 (1990), reprinted in 1990
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Supreme Court unanimously resolved the matter in Chevron US.A.
Incorporated v. Echazabal.5 6 In doing so, the Court explicitly
distinguished the ADA from previous antidiscrimination legislation
in a manner that is examined further in Part III of this note.
IX. CHEVRON US.A. INCORPORATED v. ECHAZABAL: THE
GENERALIZED VS. THE INDIVIDUALIZED
The case arose after Mario Echazabal's application for
employment with Chevron U.S.A. Incorporated (Chevron) was
denied twice, and his then-current employment with independent
contractors retained by Chevron was terminated following two
separate company doctors' determinations that his medical condition
would be exacerbated by exposure to toxins present in the refinery.
Mario Echazabal worked for various independent contractors retained
by Chevron for approximately 17 years before applying directly to
Chevron for a job in the coker unit of its El Segundo refinery. The
company extended him an offer of employment conditioned on the
results of a physical examination. The examination showed an
uncorrectable liver abnormality ultimately found to be due to the
hepatitis C virus. Chevron's physicians concluded that exposure to
hepatoxic chemicals involved in the job would further damage
Echazabal's already reduced liver capacity, seriously endanger his
health, and potentially cause his death." On the basis of this
examination, Echazabal was not hired by Chevron. Three years later
Echazabal applied for a position as a "plant helper" in the El Segundo
coker unit, and again underwent a similar physical examination.
Once again Chevron withdrew its conditional offer of employment on
the basis of this exam, and this time Chevron requested that the
contractor for whom Echazabal was then working immediately
remove him from the refinery or place him in a position that would
eliminate his exposure to chemicals. Subsequently, Echazabal was
removed from the refinery altogether.
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 457; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 76, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 359. Frequent citation is also made to the following statement
by ADA co-sponsor, Senator Kennedy:
The ADA provides that a valid qualification standard is that a person not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace-that is, to other coworkers or customers.... It is important,
however, that the ADA specifically refers to health and safety threats to
others. Under the ADA, employers may not deny a person an employment
opportunity based on paternalistic concerns regarding the person's health.
136 Cong. Rec. S9684-03, at S9697 (1990).
56. 536 U.S. 73, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
57. Brief for Petitioner at 1-2, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73,
122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (No. 00-1406).
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Echazabal filed suit in state court claiming that Chevron's
decision to exclude him from the refinery violated the ADA.
Chevron removed the suit to federal court and successfully moved for
summaryjudgment arguing that the company was entitled to exclude
Echazabal because his employment would pose a "direct threat" to his
own health or safety.
A. Ninth Circuit Reversal
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the question was squarely
presented: does the direct threat defense encompass threats to a
worker's own health or safety?58 On rehearing, a divided panel of the
court59 reversed the district court's judgment, holding (1) any direct
threat posed to Echazabal's own health or safety did not provide
Chevron with an affirmative defense to liability under the ADA for
refusing to hire him, and (2) any risk that Echazabal's liver would be
damaged from further exposure to solvents and chemicals present in
the refinery did not preclude him from being "otherwise qualified"
within the meaning of ADA. '  The court first examined whether
Chevron had satisfied the direct threat defense, relying foremost on
a textual argument from the wording of the ADA. The majority
found that, "[o]n its face, the provision does not include direct threats
to the health or safety of the disabled individual himself."'" Using the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the court asserted that
"by specifying only threats to 'other individuals in the workplace,' the
statute makes it clear that threats to other persons-including the
58. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. Cal.
2000).
59. The court initially rendered a unanimous opinion, 213 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir.
Cal. 2000), but on rehearing Judge Trott dissented, 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. Cal.
2000).
60. 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. Cal. 2000). Other circuits had interpreted the
provision requiring that an ADA plaintiff be "otherwise qualified" to include, as an
essential function of the job, being able to perform the job without harming himself.
See Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1999) (degenerative
arthritis which would be exacerbated by employment position rendered the plaintiff
not qualified to do the job because he could not perform the essential functions of
the position); E.E.O.C. v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997) (suicidal
therapist dismissed from her job was not a qualified individual because the ability
to handle prescription medications without posing a threat to herself was an
essential function of the job). The Ninth Circuit majority later addressed whether
Echazabal was an "otherwise qualified" individual, defining the term "essential
functions" to mean those "job functions... that constitute a part of the performance
of the job." Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1071. For Mario Echazabal, the majority
interpreted this narrowly to consist of "various actions that helped keep the coker
unit running." Id. at 1071.
61. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1066.
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disabled individual himself-are not included within the scope of the
defense."'62 The majority also found that the legislative history of the
ADA further bolstered their interpretation, noting that in nearly every
instance in which the term "direct threat" appeared in conference
reports, committee reports and hearings, and even the floor debate, it
was accompanied by a reference to "threats to others" or "other
individuals in the workplace."63 The court found their reading of the
ADA even more persuasive in light of what they perceived to be the
policies underlying the enactment of the ADA, namely, Congress's
desire to prohibit discrimination based on overprotective rules or
policies.'
The majority understood the ADA to embody a general principle
against the paternalistic treatment of disabled persons. The court
found support for this objective in two Title VII cases: Dothard v.
Rawlinson65 and International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Incorporated.66 In the context of a Title VII claim of gender
discrimination against a female prison guard, the Dothard Court
stated that "[i]n the usual case, the argument that a particular job is
too dangerous for women may appropriately be met by the rejoinder
that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to
make that choice for herself."67 Similarly, in Johnson Controls, the
Court restated that "danger to a woman herself does not justify
discrimination," and held that an employer could notjustify exclusion
of women from certain positions at a battery manufacturing plant
simply because of the threats that lead exposure posed to a woman's
own reproductive health.6" The Ninth Circuit majority concluded that
"[g]iven Congress's decision in the Title VII context to allow all
individuals to decide for themselves whether to put their own health
62. Id. at 1066-67.
63. Id. at 1067, citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-596, at 57, 60, 77, 84 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 566, 569, 586, 593. The court noted one
passage in the legislative history which appeared to contradict their reading of the
defense. However, the majority found that, since it did not take place in the context
of discussing the direct threat defense, it was not directly applicable to their inquiry.
See Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1068 n.6 (citing the report of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, which states that, "if the examining physician [finds] that there
[is] a high probability of substantial harm if the candidate performs the particular
functions of the job in question, the employer [may] reject the candidate." H.R. Rep.
No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 73-74, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355-56).
64. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1068, citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 74,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356 (noting that "[p]aternalism is perhaps the
most pervasive form of discrimination for people with disabilities").
65. 433 U.S. 321, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
66. 499U.S. 187, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
67. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335, 97 S. Ct. at 2730.
68. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202, 111 S. Ct. at 1205 (citing Dothard, 433
U.S. at 335, 97 S. Ct. at 2729-30).
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and safety at risk, it should come as no surprise that it would enact
legislation allowing the same freedom of choice to disabled
individuals."69 On further appeal however, a unanimous Supreme
Court was scarcely convinced by this jurisprudence, and appeared
highly skeptical of the applicability of Title VII case law in the
context of ADA discrimination claims.
B. Unanimous Disagreement
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the sole issue of
whether the EEOC interpretation of the direct threat defense is
permitted by the ADA.7" The Court first addressed the Ninth
Circuit's textual interpretation of the statute, specifically their use of
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, finding three logical
flaws with the lower court's reasoning. First, the Court stated that the
"direct threat to others" provision was included only as an illustration,
rather than an exclusive list, of legitimate qualification standards
falling within the larger category of qualifications which are "job-
related and consistent with business necessity."71 The Court found
that these "spacious defensive categories" indicate that broad
discretion was to be used (either by an agency or a court) in setting
the limits of permissible qualification standards,7 2 and in such
instances utilization of the expression-exclusion maxim is misplaced.
Furthermore, the Court found that Congress's decision to use
69. Echazabalv. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 226F.3d 1063, 1068-69(9thCir. 2000).
The circuit court's interpretation of the direct threat defense created tension with the
decisions of at least two other circuits. See Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177
F.3d 599,603 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that employee with degenerative arthritis was
not qualified within the meaning of the ADA since he could not perform the
essential functions of the job without exacerbating his arthritis), and Moses v.
American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (termination of
epileptic employee upheld because of the significant risk to himself posed by the
possibility that he might have a seizure while exposed to machinery reaching
temperatures of 350 degrees Fahrenheit)
70. Chevron US.A. Inc. v Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
The Court passed on the issue of whether Echazabal was a "qualified individual"
within the meaning of the ADA. The Court stated, "[t]hat issue will only resurface
if the Circuit concludes that the decision of respondent's employer to exclude him
was not based on the sort of individualized medical enquiry required by the
regulation, an issue on which the District Court granted summary judgment for
petitioner and which we leave to the Ninth Circuit for initial appellate consideration
if warranted." Id. at 76 n.1, 122 S. Ct. at 2047 n.1.
71. Id. at 80, 122 S. Ct. at 2050. The Court found support for this argument in
the language of the statute specifying that qualification standards which are job-
related and consistent with business necessity may include a requirement that the
individual not pose a direct threat to others in the workplace. Id.
72. Id.
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language identical to the direct threat provision contained in the
Rehabilitation Act, while knowing that the EEOC had interpreted
that language to include threats-to-self, precluded a convincing
argument that Congress unequivocally intended to exclude threats-
to-self from the direct threat provision of the ADA.73 Finally, the
Court found that Congress could not possibly have meant the direct
threat provision to be an exhaustive listing of safety defenses
available to employers because they did not even list threats to
others outside of the workplace. The Court insisted, "If Typhoid
Mary had come under the ADA, would a meat packer have been
defenseless if Mary had sued after being turned away?" 74 In sum,
the Court viewed the direct threat provision of the ADA as merely
one example of a possible defense which would fall within the more
general category of qualification standards shown to be job-related
and consistent with business necessity. In this way, the agency
interpretation extending the provision to allow for other examples,
namely threats to the disabled individual himself, did not contradict
the text of the ADA.
After determining that Congress did not speak exhaustively on
the matter, the Court employed the Chevron U.S.A. Incorporated v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Incorporated' analysis to
determine whether the regulation was a reasonable interpretation of
the statutory defense for qualification standards that are job-related
and consistent with business necessity. Chevron's proffered reasons
for the regulation included a desire to avoid time lost to sickness,
excessive turnover from medical retirement or death, litigation
under state tort law, and the risk of violating the national
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA).76 The Court
found the OSHA concern sufficient to declare the regulation
reasonable, stating that although there is uncertainty as to whether
an employer would be liable for hiring an individual who knowingly
73. Id. at 82, 122 S. Ct. at 2051. The Court questioned, "Did Congress mean
to imply that the agency had been wrong in reading the earlier language to allow it
to recognize threats to self, or did Congress just assume that the agency was free to
do under the ADA what it had already done under the earlier Act's identical
language? There is no way to tell." Id. at 83, 122 S. Ct. at 2051.
74. Id. at 84, 122 S. Ct. at 2051. Arguably, "other individuals in the
workplace" can be read to encompass customers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000).
In fact, the caselaw is relatively settled that the employer may lawfully require that
its employees not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in
the workplace, including customers and co-workers. See, e.g., Robertson v.
Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that neurologist with
ADD, which affected his memory, posed direct threat to his patients).
75. 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
76. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84, 122 S. Ct. at 2052, citing OSHA, 84 Stat. 1590,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2000).
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consented to the dangers posed by the job, "there is no denying that
the employer would be asking for trouble."77
Lastly, the Court addressed the Ninth Circuit's resort to the
ADA's principle against paternalism. The Court announced a
distinction between individualized risk assessments and the type of
workplace paternalism prohibited by Title VII and the jurisprudence
cited by the Ninth Circuit. Noting that the ADA was intended to
address workplace paternalism, the Court cited the Congressional
findings' recognition of "overprotective rules and policies"78 as a
form of discrimination. However, the Court rejected the contention
that Congress sought to eliminate an employer's ability to refuse to
place particular disabled workers at a specifically demonstrated risk.
They pointed instead to an overall goal of breaking down the barriers
created by an employer's generalized assessments, rooted in unproven
stereotypes and bias, which were too often applied to the class of
disabled persons as a whole. The Court found that the EEOC
regulation outlawed precisely this sort of "sham protection," by
demanding a "particularized enquiry into the harms the employee
would probably face." 79 The Court noted the contrary legislative
history which decried paternalism in general terms but found that
"those comments that elaborate actually express the more pointed
concern that such justifications are usually pretextual, rooted in
generalities and misperceptions about disabilities."8
Advancing the distinction between generalized and individualized
risk assessments even further, the Court went on to address the Title
VII jurisprudence that had employed a contradictory analysis in the
context of sex discrimination. The Court briefly noted that Title VII,
like the ADA, "allows employers to defend otherwise discriminatory
practices that are 'consistent with business necessity."'81 Yet they
stated, simply, that Dothard and Johnson Controls are "beside the
point," because Title VII is generally concerned with "paternalistic
judgments based on the broad category of gender, while the EEOC
has required that judgments based on the direct threat provision be
made on the basis of individualized risk assessments."" Hence, the
77. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84, 122 S. Ct. at 2052.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000).
79. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 86, 122 S. Ct. at 2053.They stated that the "EEOC
was certainly acting within the reasonable zone when it saw a difference between
rejecting workplace paternalism and ignoring specific and documented risks to the
employee himself, even if the employee would take his chances for the sake of
getting a job." Id.
80. Id. at 86 n.5, 122 S. Ct. at 2053 n.5.
81. Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
82. Id. at 86 n.5, 122 S. Ct. at 2053 n.5, citing Dothard v. Rawlinson,433 U.S.
321, 335, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2730 (1977); International Union, UAW v. Johnson
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Court apparently suggested that generalized discrimination based on
pretext is unlawful, both with respect to women and disabled persons.
However, adverse employment decisions which are individualized -
i.e. based on the specific characteristics and risk associated with a
single disabled individual - are permitted by the ADA and should,
therefore, be upheld.
III. UNRAVELING ECHAZABAL: INCOMPATIBLE MODEL OR
DISINGENUOUS MANDATE?
In making the distinction between generalized and individualized
risk assessments, the Supreme Court erected something of a wall of
separation between Title VII sex discrimination and the
antidiscrimination mandate embodied in the ADA. The implications
of this unanimous decision require thorough examination in order to
determine the future applicability of Title VII discrimination theory
in the disability context. This section seeks to do just that. Part A
seeks to determine whether there is something inherent in the ADA's
antidiscrimination mandate that sets it apart from Title VII sex
discrimination prohibitions, and particularly lends itself to
recognition of the self-harm defense provided byEchazabal. Part Al
discusses the paternalistic framework through which disability has
traditionally been viewed, and part A2 illustrates how paternalistic
models of disability have influenced the evolution of disability rights
in America. Part A3 then demonstrates how this paternalistic
approach is manifest in the current version of the ADA. Following
this investigation, part B of this section contrasts Congress's
approach to disability discrimination in the workplace with its
approach to discrimination based on another form of biological
variance, namely sex.
The essence of my argument is that the inequality of disabled
persons with the nondisabled majority83 is strikingly similar to the
inequality of women with men. However, disability discrimination
was not a party to the social movement underlying sex discrimination
prohibitions. Lacking this history, and perhaps political clout, the
provisions of the ADA are predominantly understood against a
backdrop that views the accommodation mandated by the statute as
an inherently paternalistic "helpful intervention" rather than a civil
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 202, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1205 (1991).
83. The author notes that the existence of a "nondisabled majority" depends
entirely on how we define the category of "disabled." As Michael Kaback,
professor and Chief M.D. in the Medical Genetics Division at the University of
California at San Diego, remarked, "We're all mutants . . . [e]verybody is
genetically defective." John Rennie, Grading the Gene Tests, Sci. An., June 1994,
at 88, 90-91.
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right. This is largely attributable to the fact that the ADA was not
enacted according to the same model utilized in Title VII sex
discrimination prohibitions, suggesting that Congress's civil rights
rhetoric, in the context of the ADA, may be somewhat disingenuous.
Therefore, while the Supreme Court was likely correct in Echazabal
to treat the statute in a different manner than Title VII sex
discrimination, if Congress is serious about actualizing their enticing
rhetoric of "emancipating" disabled persons from an exclusionary
workplace, then the ADA must be revised to provide a clearer and
more sincere antidiscrimination statute that could operate from the
premise that freedom from discrimination in this context is, indeed,
a civil right. Toward this end, part IV of this note offers two distinct
potential revisions of the ADA.
A. The Stubborn Paternalistic Assumption
Conflicts between autonomy and paternalism strike at the very
heart of civil rights controversies. While embodying many possible
meanings, the term "paternalism," as used in this comment, refers to
deliberate interference with an individual's freedom of choice,
contrary to his express wishes, and under the guise of acting for his
own good. 4 The Court in Echazabal essentially declared that an
employer is free to exclude a worker from a position which would
place him in certain danger. Hence, the Court's decision allows
employers to directly interfere with an applicant's or an employee's
freedom of choice contrary to his express wishes and under the guise
of acting for his own good, thus falling within the definition of
paternalism employed in this note.85 While this decision is the first
84. See also, Paul Burrows, Analyzing Legal Paternalism, 15 Int'l Rev. L. &
Econ. 489,490 (1995); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONIST 64, 65 (1972)
("By paternalism I shall understand roughly the interference with a person's liberty
of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness,
needs, interests or values ofthe person being coerced."); David Luban, Paternalism
and the LegalProfession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454, 461 (1981) (defining paternalism
as "the imposing of constraints on an individual's liberty for the purpose of
promoting his or her own good."); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on
the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 Duke L.J. 848,
889 (1990) ("With its roots in the notion of fatherhood and acting like a father,
'paternalism' means making decisions on others' behalf to protect them from harm
or to advance their well-being. Although the motivation for paternalistic
intervention may be altruistic, it inevitably involves an element of autonomy-
deprivation for the 'protected' party.").
85. The author notes that such action may not always be taken in order to
protect the employee or applicant from harm, but, rather, is oftentimes a product of
economic self interest - i.e. fear of increased insurance, workers' compensation, tort
liability, or, as mentioned by the Supreme Court in Echazabal, OSHA sanctions.
However, the motive for the employer's action, for purposes of this comment, is not
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pronouncement from the Supreme Court recognizing an express
threat-to-self defense, other lower court decisions have reached
essentially the same result by finding that either an applicant or
employee was not a qualified individual with a disability because he
could not safely perform the essential functions of the job in
question 86 or that the safety-based qualification standard was a
business necessity.8 7 Many commentators assert that the ADA is
intended to forbid such paternalistic employment decisions. In
support for this proposition these critics frequently cite the
Congressional findings' concern about "the discriminatory effects of
. .. overprotective rules and policies" as well as similar statements in
Congressional reports.88 These same scholars condemn the EEOC's
incorporation of a self-harm defense as introducing an element of
paternalism that directly contradicts the ADA's legislative purpose.
However, Congressional intent is a troublesome, clouded, and often
indiscernible concept.89
What is clear is that, with limited modification, the text of the
ADA largely incorporates the precedent and definitions that evolved
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Arguably, a paternalistic
essential. Action taken under the guise of protecting a worker from the type of
harm that might result in such claims still serves to limit his or her freedom of
choice against his wishes, and, hence, may be characterized as paternalistic.
86. See, e.g., Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1388, 1393 (5th Cir.
1993) (Rehabilitation Act case upholding city's application of DOT's diabetes
standard to drivers of non-DOT-covered vehicles: "[A]n individual is not qualified
for ajob if there is a genuine substantial risk that he or she could be injured or could
injure others, and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk.");
Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (Rehabilitation Act case
upholding FBI's ban on insulin-dependent diabetic special agents: "Congress' intent
in enacting the Rehabilitation Act was not that employers must accept applicants forjobs where eminently qualified medical specialists are of the opinion that the job
requirements pose a reasonably probable risk of harm to the applicant and others
by reason of the applicant's 'handicap."'); Wann v. American Airlines, Inc., 878 F.
Supp. 82 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (finding a safety requirement included in the definition
of "qualified individual with a disability,"and holding that applicant's breathing
problems rendered him unqualified for position in question because he could not
safely perform the essential functions of the job, which entailed exposure to exhaust
and other fumes).
87. See E.E.O.C. v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that
safety-based qualification standards applying across the board to an entire class of
employees need not be defended under the direct threat provision, but rather may
be defended on the grounds that the qualification standard was a business
necessity).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1210 l(a)(5) (2000); see also, House Commr. on Education and
Labor, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at
74 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267; and S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 38
(Report of Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources) (1990).
89. See supra text accompanying note 55, and the sources cited therein.
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interpretation of the direct threat defense is a logical result of the
inherently paternalistic approach employed by the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 and, ultimately, incorporated into the ADA. In order to
expose the paternalistic approach to disability discrimination that was
incorporated into the ADA, it is helpful to understand the history and
evolution of disability rights in America and, specifically, the models
of disability that have traditionally affected legislative enactments in
this arena.
1. Disability Models: The Helpless, the Unrealistic, and the
Overachievers
The evolution of disability rights in America is a product of the
influence of two predominant models of disability: the medical model
and the social pathology model. 9 The medical model of disability
operates from the fundamental premise that disability is an
"infirmity" best addressed by doctors who can attempt to "cure" or
rehabilitate the individual.9' Hence, by definition, disabled persons
under this model are fundamentally unequal because of their
inherently defective internal traits. By treating disability as an
internal or inherent defect possessed by the individual, 92 this view
establishes that the primary duty of disabled persons is to actively
seek out rehabilitation through modem science so that they can rid
themselves of their defects and, once "healed," rejoin a nondisabled
society.93 Correspondingly, the duty of government under a medical
90. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:
Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with
Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1341 (1993) [hereinafter "Drimmer"]; Richard K.
Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 Berkeley
J. Emp. & Lab. L. 213 (2000) (examining other theoretical paradigms to explain
how disability is conceptualized including the moral model, the medical model, the
economic model, the social model, and the civil rights model) [hereinafter "Scotch,
Models"]; Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 (2000); Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope,
74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 621, 649-55 (1999); Adam A. Milani, Living in the World:
A New Look at the Disabled in the Law of Torts, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 323, 328-38
(1999); Bonnie O'Day, Economics versus CivilRights, 3 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
291 (1994).
91. Drimmer, supra note'90, at 1347; see also Richard K. Scotch, From Good
Will to Civil Rights (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter "Scotch, Good Will"]. For a more
detailed examination and critical discussion of the medical model of disability see
Gary L. Albrecht, The Disability Business: Rehabilitation in America 67-90 (1992).
92. Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the
Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 7
(1999).
93. See Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1348-49.
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model is both to supply financial support to this helpless, yet
deserving group, and to encourage the rehabilitation of their damaged
bodies and minds.94
The social pathology model similarly seeks to remedy the
"inherent defect" of disability, but operates from the premise that
disability is a "deviant" characteristic, largely resulting from internal
attitudinal or behavioral obstacles possessed by the disabled
individual.95 Hence, the marginal economic and social status of the
disabled, under this view, stems from a lack of motivation and
emotional adjustment. 96 The goal, then, under a social pathology
model, is to "retrain" the attitudinal and behavioral abnormalities
afflicting the disabled person in order to introduce the reformed
individual into the mainstream of society.97 Special attention is
devoted to motivating the disabled individual to overcome his
inherent "defeatist" attitude. 98
Both models share the assumption that, to the extent that a
disabled person struggles in adjusting to environments designed for
people with few or no impairments, the fault lies in the disabled
person himself, rather than in the environments. The medical model
produces narratives of "helpless cripples" in need of charity or pity,
while the social pathology model induces the idea that disabled
persons should overcome their disabilities through persistently
attacking their limitations.9 One writer aptly illustrates the logical
consequences of the often melded views: "Our attitudes toward
disabilities seem to be a curious amalgam of fear and ignorance,
94. Scotch, Models, supra note 90, at 214.
95. See generally, Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1349; Peter Blanck, Civil War
Pensions and Disability, in Ohio State Law Journal 2001 Symposium: Facing the
Challenges of the ADA: The First Ten Years and Beyond, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 109, 146
(2001); Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights
Litigation, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 247,271-75 (2001); Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People
with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights Movement 30-32 (1993); Anita Silvers,
Formal Justice, in Anita Silvers et al., Disability, Difference, Discrimination 56-59
(1998); Wendy Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial
Interpretations ofthe Meaning ofDisability, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 53, 56-62(2000).
96. See Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or
Biased Reasoning?, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 166 (2000) [hereinafter
"Hahn"].
97. See Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1349.
98. See Karl A. Menninger, Psychiatric Aspects of Physical Disability, at 8-17,
in Psychological Aspects of Physical Disability (James F. Garret ed., 1952)
(advocating for psychological counseling to address what he viewed as the major
problem with individuals with disabilities, motivation). For a more contemporary
illustration of the influence of this model of disability see Stuart Silverstein, Opening
Doors, Los Angeles Times, Jan 26, 1992, at D1, D8.
99. See generally, Drirnrner, supra note 90; Scotch, Models, supra note 90, at 219.
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optimism and loathing... We applaud stories about overachieving
'super-cripples,' yet segregate disabled children in basement
classrooms and isolated institutions."' ° The medical and social
pathology models entrench these notions of inherent inferiority
which, in turn, induce either pity and admiration or, alternatively,
disapproval and intolerance toward the disabled and the policies that
target them. Policies relying on these models are traditionally
justified in terms of economic efficiency and marked by rhetoric
displaying the hope of rendering the disabled individuals
"productive" members of society.'0 '
The consequence ofviewing disability in terms of the medical and
social pathology models is particularly troublesome. "Inferior" and
"non-productive" are relative concepts defined by their corresponding
"superior" and "productive" counterparts. This notion of superiority
is often, perhaps unconsciously, accepted by the nondisabled majority
and manifest in policies targeting disabled persons. The primary
consequence of this framework is the notion that the superior must act
as guardians to the inferior. When this notion of guardianship is
combined with a predisposition regarding the "normal" activities that
the disabled should strive toward - i.e. that of becoming a productive
citizen - the role of guardian takes on a paternalistic component. The
views of the superior, able-bodied majority are imposed upon the
inferior, disabled individual under the guise of helping them to
achieve what is their "proper" objective. By focusing on the inherent
inferiority of the individual, the external environment faced by the
disabled individual remains an afterthought, and it is only after the
disabled individual conforms to the nondisabled majority that he is
thought to be entitled to the same privileges enjoyed by the rest of
society. This notion of guardianship centered around productivity
uncovers the paternalistic assumption of the medical and social
pathology models: disabled persons are fundamentally unequal due
100. Frank Bowe, Handicapping America, 23 (1978).
101. See Claire H. Liachowitz, Disability as a Social Construct: Legislative
Roots 57, at 20, 77-79, 82-83, 107-08 (arguing that American public policy
demonstrates the attitude that disabled persons who are unable to work are of
diminished and lesser value); Robert Funk, Disability Rights: From Caste to Class
in the Context of Civil Rights, in Images of the Disabled, Disabling Images at 1, 16
(Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987) (discussing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973's
decree to develop vocational, rehabilitative, and independent living programs and
stating that focus of rehabilitation programs was "to create a nearly normal
person"); Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the
Category ofDisability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 5, 8-
23 (1999) ("The definition of disability in antidiscrimination law is part of a larger
cultural discourse that establishes and upholds dominant notions of health, illness,
and disability while imposing a particular set of expectations upon individuals
deemed to occupy each class.").
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to their inherent inferiority. As such, the superior, able-bodied
majority are in the best position to render helpful assistance to this
inherently flawed class ofpersons in order help them realize the rights
and privileges associated with productive citizenship (i.e. the
privileges of conformity).
Explicit endorsement of these models contributes to stereotypical
views of the disabled as broken, weak, and helpless. These
stereotypes inevitably foster the patronizing attitudes that the
nondisabled society generally holds toward people with disabilities.
Although oftentimes justified in terms of economic efficiency, such
views transform disability policies into a form of social welfare or
affirmative action far removed from a civil rights statute.' °2
Consequently, disability legislation utilizing these models has
persistently portrayed an inferior class of disabled persons in need of
outside intervention and rehabilitation in order to become fully
productive "equal" citizens. The persistence of these views
contributes to the paternalistic assumptions generally employed with
regard to polices targeting the disabled and, ultimately, thejurisprudence interpreting such policies.
2. The Evolution of Disability Rights in America
Contemporary disability legislation originated following World
War I when numerous veterans and injured soldiers successfully
lobbied Congress for the Smith-Sears Act in 1918.03 One year later,
Congress enacted the first federal legislation addressing the problem
ofcivilian disability, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act. " The model
embodied in this law stubbornly remains a decidedly influential
framework through which disability policy is viewed more than 80
years after its passage. 105 The Act attempted to address deficiencies
102. Affirmative action has a remedial goal that is designed to redress past
wrongdoing. This is inconsistent with a proper goal of disability discrimination
policy, which should aim at redressing present discrimination. See Paul C. Higgins,
Making Disability: Exploring the Social Transformation of Human Variation 199-
200 (1992).
.103. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 107, 40 Stat. 617 (1918) (amended
1919) ("to provide for vocational rehabilitation and return to civil employment of
disabled persons discharged from the military or naval forces."). For a discussion
of disability policy prior to this enactment see Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions
and Disability, in Ohio State Law Journal 2001 Symposium: Facing the Challenges
of the ADA: The First Ten Years and Beyond, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 109 (2001).
104. Act of June 2, 1920, ch. 219, 41 Stat. 735 (1920) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 731-741) (repealed 1973, and reenacted in the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355).
105. See Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1362-66; see also, Scotch, Models, supra
note 90; Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights
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in workers' compensation laws by promoting the "vocational
rehabilitation of persons disabled in industry or in any legitimate
occupation and their return to civilian employment."' 06 Strongly
influenced by the medical and social pathology models, the Act
views the problem as one of "infirmity" and the solution as one of
"rehabilitation." The Act defers to professionals to administer the
rehabilitative services and grants them the power to determine
whether an individual will ever be able to realize gainful
employment, thus rendering him entitled to receive the benefits of
the Act. Consequently, and consistent with the medical and social
pathology models underlying its enactment, the Act robbed disabled
individuals of their freedom of choice by granting "trained experts"
the power to make all decisions concerning their rehabilitative
potential, and thus, their societal inclusion.0 7 The provisions of the
Act were largely viewed as altruistic, rather than civil rights, in
nature. Subsequent amendments to the Vocational Rehabilitation
Act reinforced the medical and social pathology models of disability
and entrenched the view that enactments in this arena were
charitable in nature.1
0 8
Litigation, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 247, 271-73 (2001). ("The definition of an
'individual with a disability' (or 'handicapped individual') in the federal disability
laws enacted between 1920 and 1973 reflected the medical and social pathology
models of disability, as well as Congress' primary concern about people with
disabilities: that many ofthem were unemployed and were therefore a burden on the
national economy ... While the [present definition of disability] represents
significant progress toward conceiving disability as a civil rights construct, an
unpacking of its terms reveals remnants of the medical and social pathology models
lurking just below the surface."). Similarly, Ruth O'Brien, in her recent book,
Crippled Justice: The History of Modem Disability Policy in the Workplace, argues
that the focus of vocational rehabilitation during the 1950s and 1960s was on
"treating" the disabled and, resultantly, entrenched the notion that it is people with
disabilities, rather than society, that must change. According to her assessment,
modem disability employment practices are influenced by vocational rehabilitation
policies that only integrate disabled workers who have fully adapted themselves to
the workplace. O'Brien argues that this normative schema influences judicial
attitudes towards people with disabilities, and attributes Supreme Court resistance
to the ADA's employment provisions, to this phenomenon. See generally, Ruth
O'Brien, Crippled Justice: The History of Modem Disability Policy in the
Workplace (2001).
106. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, at 735, Act of June 2, 1920, ch. 219,41 Stat.
735 (1920) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 731-741) (repealed 1973, and
reenacted in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355
(1973)); see also Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1364.
107. See Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1366; Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of
disability underfederal anti-discrimination law: What happened? Why? And what
can we do about it?, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 91 (2000); McGowan, supra
note 19, at 53-64.
108. The Randolph-Sheppard Vending Act Amendment of 1936 authorized
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The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, °9 the first federal law expressly
prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities, extended
this progress by explicitly recognizing that obstacles facing the
disabled were discriminatory in nature. The sections dealing with
employment-501, 503, and 504-apply only to the federal
government, federal contractors, and recipients of federal funds. The
most far-reaching antidiscrimination provision of the Act, Section
504, stated that "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States.. .shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."' 10
However, subsequent amendments clarifying the new law
compromised the civil rights potential of the Act in two significant
ways. Both the definition of the term "handicap" and the
justifications for the Act rely heavily upon medical and social
pathology models. An individual is "handicapped" within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act if the person "has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities," has a "record of such impairment," or
blind persons to operate vending stands on federal property. Randolph-Sheppard
Act, ch. 638, 49 Stat. 1559 (1936) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)).
This Act evidenced the "paramount social consideration" underlying disability
legislation at this time: self-support. "[S]o long as the individual with a disability
was employed, it mattered not that the job was menial and without opportunity for
promotion or use of skills. Moreover the job chosen by Congress reinforced the
view of federal charity, as the government provided the equipment and allowed
blind vendors to sell their wares on federal property." Drimmer, supra note 90, at
1367; see also, The Vocation Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943, ch. 190, 57
Stat. 374, 374-380 (1943) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 31-41) (repealed 1973 and
reenacted in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355), and
the Vocation Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1954 § 2. Some progress away
from the medical and social pathology models was evident with the enactment of
the Architectural Barriers Act in 1968, which required that all new facilities owned
or leased by the federal government or built with public money be made accessible
to people with disabilities. Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (1968) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1988)); see also 36 C.F.R. §§ 1190.1-1192.79
(1992) (setting the minimum standards for the four federal agencies charged with
enforcement). The progress of the Act lies in its acknowledgment that
discrimination could be found in the external environment that disabled persons
face, rather than simply a product of the inherent inferior condition of disabled
individuals. However, the limitation of the Act to new public buildings implied that
the cost of remodeling existing public buildings overrode the disabled person's right
of accessibility. See Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1378. Moreover, enforcement of
the Act was inconsistent at best. Id.
109. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 393 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
793-94 (2000)).
110. § 504, 87 Stat. at 395 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000)).
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is "regarded as having such impairment."'' . The term "impairment,"
evoking images of a person who is inherently defective in some
fashion, reinforces the stereotypes associated with the medical model
of disability. " The idea is that disabled persons are flawed, although
by no fault of their own, and societal inclusion is, then,. premised on
the correction or repair of this disabling condition. This tendency to
equate disability with impairment significantly limited the
effectiveness of the Rehabilitation Act. Hence, in a manner
antithetical to its expressed goal, the Act served to reinforce the
medical model's portrayal of helpless disabled persons, unable to
function in any meaningful fashion and, therefore, deserving of pity,
charity, or "special" services. This is further strengthened by the
Act's description of disability as a condition that "substantially limits
one or more.., major life activities." 3 Equating biological anomaly
with inferiority and a generalized limitation of ability characterizes
disability in a fashion that presupposes incompetence and particularly
lends itself to paternalistic interpretation." 4  Consequently,
notwithstanding its civil rights rhetoric, the Rehabilitation Act
definition of disability is centered on a framework that views the
inherent physical defect within the disabled individual, rather than the
external discriminatory environment, as the primary source of the
impairment. Critics of this definition argue that Congress failed to
grant full citizenship to people with disabilities, but rather
111. Pub. L. No. 93-516 § 11 (a), 88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (1974) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (2000)). The 1978 regulations provided the specific definitions
of "physical or mental impairment," "major life activity," and "has a record of such
impairment." See 45 C.F.R. § 84.30) (2002); see also Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 (1979) (defining an "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual" as one who can meet all of the requirements "in spite of" his or her
handicap).
112. See Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability
Rights Litigation, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 247, 273 (2001); see also Drimmer, supra
note 90, at 1384.
113. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 361 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 705(9) (2002)). See also, Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity
in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 247, 273-74 (2001) ("[B]ecause
the definition frames disability as an impairment within an individual...it reinforces
the idea that disability is a phenomenon located squarely in the individual herself,
rather than in the societal structures that surround her and contribute to the disabling
effects of her difference.").
114. See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection,
and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and
Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 81,
84 (2001) [hereinafter "Silvers & Stein"]. Courts interpreting this provision stress
the "substantially limited" portion of the definition of disability to the extent that the
question of defining whether or not a plaintiff has a disability is determined almost
exclusively by disputes about the loss of a major life activity. See Hahn, supra note
96, at 171.
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acknowledged them "only as 'flawed' individuals not at fault for
shortcomings that society must endure." '15
The rights provided in the regulations implementing the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 further reflect a view of the inferiority of
disabled persons. Like the Act itself, the regulations melded civil rights
notions with ideas predicated on the medical and social pathology
models." 6 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
regulations," 7 at first glance, appeared to recognize the discriminatory
structural barriers to equal participation faced by disabled individuals and
to aggressively pronounce expansive civil rights. The regulations
forcefully declared that "[a] recipient shall make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee."" 8 Yet they
backed away from this pronouncement by making the right entirely
dependent on the employer's pocketbook: if a proposed reasonable
accommodation should impose an "undue hardship," the
accommodation is unnecessary."' Some scholars have argued that this
emphasis on economic notions hearkens back to the medical and social
pathology models. 20  As long as the goal is based on productive
citizenship, the argument goes, an accommodation that outweighs its
economic potential will undoubtedly be viewed as unnecessarily
burdensome. Phrased in these terms, the right to be free from
discrimination is not a civil right; rather, it is an economic determination
of relative cost and benefit. In so severely compromising its method,
Congress appears insincere in its assertion that the elimination of
discriminatory impediments to equality is, in fact, the goal.' 2 ' Hence, in
115. Drinner,supra note 90, at 1344-45.
Congress has issued a message that people with disabilities do not deserve
full citizenship or equal participation in the community and are merely
tolerated when they can become economic participants. This treatment in
the law results in the granting of limited rights that do not guarantee
people with disabilities full access to society. Id.
116. Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1387.
117. The task of implementing regulations to interpret the Rehabilitation Act
was marked by delay and controversy. For the reasons underlying the delay see
Scotch, Good Will, supra note 91, at 60-120.
118. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (2000).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1387.
121. The preamble to the regulation states: "[T]he proposed regulation does not
take into account the cost or difficulty of eliminating discrimination in establishing
the standards for what practices constitute discriminations ... The Department
agrees in principle with the concept that cost or difficulty are appropriate
considerations, not in determining what constitutes discrimination, but in fashioning
a remedy if a recipient has been found to be discriminating." Programs and
Activities Receiving or Benefitting from Federal Financial Assistance:
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,548, 29,550 (1976).
Nonetheless, the provision of undue hardship does not factor only into
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the view of some scholars, the undue hardship provision further reflects
the notion, still embraced by much of society, that the inequality of the
disabled with the nondisabled majority is a product of flaws within the
disabled individuals, rather than flaws in the system.
The contrary position embraced by some fiscal conservatives is that
the ADA goes much farther than traditional civil rights laws because it
requires employers to do more than simply treat individuals with
disabilities the same way that they would treat other similarly qualified
applicants or workers. Indeed, the ADA imposes an affirmative
obligation to provide reasonable accommodations to make it possible for
people with disabilities to perform essential job functions and to secure
equal enjoyment of all terms and conditions of employment. On this
ground, observers draw sharp lines between Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964122 and other older civil rights enactments, which are said to
be "real anti-discrimination law[s],"' and the mandate embodied in the
ADA and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA),'24 said
to be "accommodation" laws. 25 Accordingly, it is charged that the
determinations of appropriate remedies, rather it acts as an afflirmative defense to
compliance with the enactment.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
123. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. and Univs. for Northeastern
Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2000) (the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 is a "real anti-discrimination law"), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1190, 121 S. Ct. 1187 (2001).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
125. Numerous commentators have advanced this distinction. See, e.g.,
Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial
Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability
Discrimination Law, 78 Or. L. Rev. 27, 75 (1999) (arguing that reasonable
accommodation "is a concept alien to most antidiscrimination claims brought
under Title VII" and "is, in essence, a form of affirmative action for disabled
individuals"); Deborah A. Calloway, Dealing With Diversity: Changing Theories
of Discrimination, 10 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 481, 491 (1995) ("Equality
in one dimension means inequality in another dimension. Equal employment
opportunity is achieved under the ADA by mandating different treatment for
individuals with disabilities; different treatment in the form of reasonable
accommodations."); John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in
Perspective: Three Concepts ofEquality, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2583, 2585-86 (1994)
(characterizing antidiscrimination requirements as pursuing the widely endorsed
goal of "intrinsic equality" and accommodation requirements as pursuing the
more normatively questionable and controversial goal of "constructed equality");
Lisa Eichhorn, Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: The Limits
of the Copy-And-Paste Function, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 575, 605 (2002) ("In the end,
whether the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision represents a
subcategory of affirmative action legislation or a different animal altogether, it
departs starkly from the formal equality model and necessitates an expanded
understanding of civil rights and equal opportunity."); Patricia Illingworth &
Wendy E. Parmet, Positively Disabled: The Relationship Between the Definition
of Disability and Rights Under the ADA, in Americans with Disabilities:
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undue hardship provision is essential to prevent critics from targeting the
ADA as another "unfunded federal mandate" imposed on private
business.2 6
Exploring Implications of the Law for Individuals and Institutions 3, 8 (Leslie
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) ("The genius of the ADA is that it
forthrightly melds positive and negative rights, creating a civil rights statute that
goes beyond the simplistic equal-opportunity-as-negative-rights model
represented by Title VII."); Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups,
53 Stan. L. Rev. 833 (2001) (arguing that the law should prohibit "simple
discrimination" without limit, but that requirements of accommodation must be
limited to the extent that the resources used in accommodation might be better
spent on other societal priorities); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something
Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 Conn.
L. Rev. 603, 608 (2001) ("The ADA relies on a different vision of equality [than
that of Title VII] to address workplace discrimination."); Miranda Oshige
McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 Ga. L. Rev.
27, 35 (2000) ("[T]he ADA appears to make a revolutionary break with the old
ways of thinking about discrimination while charting a new course of affirmative
obligations to ensure real equality."); George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its
Discontents, 81 Va. L. Rev. 117, 145 (1995) (finding it "[s]omewhat
paradoxical[]" that the ADA defines "the employer's duty not to discriminate"
as "includ[ing] the duty to take account of an individual's disability in order to
make a reasonable accommodation"); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA's
Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws In The Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 Ohio St. L.J.
335, 353 (2001) (referring to the "contradiction between the traditional civil
rights label given the ADA and the affirmative action obligation imposed by the
Act, which vastly exceeds the traditional nondiscrimination mandate of the civil
rights laws the ADA purports to emulate"); John M. Vande Walle, Note, In the
Eye of the Beholder: Issues of Distributive and Corrective Justice in the ADA 's
Employment Protection for Persons Regarded as Disabled, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
897, 923-25 (1998) (arguing that Title VII and the ADEA serve the interest of
corrective justice, while the ADA's accommodation requirement "primarily
serves the purposes of distributive justice in that it establishes criteria that
identify a group that needs or merits a greater distribution of societal goods.");
Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities
Act?, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 307, 310-11 & nn.21-22 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan &
George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1, 2-4, 9 (1996); Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and
Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 3-
4 (2000)("The ADA incorporated a profoundly different model of equality from
that associated with traditional non- discrimination statutes like Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964... The ADA required not only that disabled individuals
be treated no worse than non- disabled individuals with whom they were similarly
situated, but also directed that in certain contexts they be treated differently,
arguably better, to achieve an equal effect."); Sherwin Rosen, Disability
Accommodation and the Labor Market, in Disability and Work 18, 21 (Carolyn
L. Weaver ed., 1991); but see, Jolls, supra note 14, at 643 (arguing that many
aspects of antidiscrimination law are in fact requirements of accommodation).
126. The claim that the ADA represents an unfunded mandate was voiced by
conservative critics of the ADA from the time of its passage in 1991. Professor
NOTES
The ADA's reasonable accommodation provision may represent
a more explicit or readily apparent case of accommodation than was
evident in previous antidiscrimination laws, but an argument may be
made that the line between accommodation and antidiscrimination is
not as bright as some scholars and politicians would suggest. Several
scholars have demonstrated that many aspects of antidiscrimination
law are in fact requirements of accommodation.127 Particularly with
regard to the disparate impact branch of Title VII, specific,
demonstrable costs are frequently imposed on employers in order to
effect compliance with its mandate. This is discussed in more detail
in part B of this section (and revisited, to some extent, in part IV(B)).
But for now it is sufficient to say that the undue hardship provision
of the ADA may not be justifiable solely by resort to the argument
that the ADA stands apart from previous antidiscrimination law by
virtue of its accommodation requirement.
Hence, the argument that the undue hardship provision severely
dilutes the Act's civil rights potential appears to have some merit.
Jerry Mashaw immediately observed that the ADA uses "potentially unfair taxation
to provide in-kind benefits, which a deficit-happy Congress does not want to fund
through the budget process." Jerry L. Mashaw, In Search of the Disabled, in
Disability and Work: Incentives, Rights and Opportunities 70 (Carolyn L. Weaver
ed., 1991). Carolyn Weaver refers to the ADA's reasonable accommodation
requirement as a feature that "distorts a civil rights measure into what is essentially
a mandated benefits program for the disabled." Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives vs.
Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in Disability & Work: Incentives, Rights, and
Opportunities 1, 3-17 (Carolyn L. Weaver, ed., 1991) (arguing for incentives to
replace rights-based policies toward disability). Likewise, Professors Issacharoff
and Nelson assert that the "'unfunded mandate' quality of the obligation was
magnified by the undefined scope of the ensuing responsibility to accommodate."
Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities
Act?, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 307, 317-18 (2001). Professor Richard Epstein similarly
argues, "Under the ADA, Congress mandates a set of off-budget subsidies not
explicitly taken into account in setting federal policy. The expenditures are borne
by private businesses and by state and local governments, which are left to scramble
for resources as best they can. By working through the regulatory mode, Congress
ensures the fatal separation of the right to order changes from the duty to pay for
them." Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment
Discrimination Law 493 (1992) (arguing that a system of federal grants should
replace the ADA so that Congress pays for the accommodations that it wants
employers to make)[hereinafter "Epstein"].
127. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 14, at 645; Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Anti-
Discrimination, Accommodation, and Universal Mandates-Aren 't They All the
Same?, 24 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 111 (2003). See also, Reva B. Siegel, Note,
Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 Yale
L.J. 929, 940-46 (1985) [hereinafter "Siegel"]; Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N.
Cooney, The Miller- Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the
Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 513, 559-60 (1983)
[hereinafter "Krieger & Cooney"].
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Consideration of the cost of eliminating discriminatory structural
barriers to equality effectively "redefines" the right such that "equal
treatment" for people with disabilities becomes less than equal, and
cripples who require greater than reasonable accommodations are
viewed as obviously unfit for the workplace and unworthy of
integration.' Discrimination is illegal when it can be conveniently
remedied, yet somehow defensible when its eradication would be
too burdensome. This evidences an approach marked by
"toleration" rather than civil rights. 29
By explicitly endorsing the medical and social pathology
models, the Rehabilitation Act reinforced stereotypical views of a
broken, inferior class of disabled persons dragging down the
national economy and requiring helpful intervention. 13°The goal of
helping a class of inferior persons to become productive members
of society, while perhaps morally commendable, does not lend itself
to recognition as a "landmark" civil rights statute. On the contrary,
views of inferiority and goals of productivity lend themselves to
patronizing and paternalistic attitudes targeting the disabled under
the guise of charity, helpful intervention, and even protection.
Rather than a decisive break from these models, the ADA was, for
the most part, a wholesale incorporation of the language of the
Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations. 3'
Consequently, the paternalistic, stereotypical philosophy associated
with the medical and social pathology models persists in the
framework manifest in the ADA.
128. See Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1390-91.
129. Similar approaches were used to limit the civil rights associated with the
Act's provision regarding program accessibility. The burden of making facilities
accessible did not apply to every existing facility and not even to every part of a
single facility. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.22(a) (1992). In the arena of education, the
situation was quite different as the regulations were similar to provisions of the
Individuals withDisabilities EducationAct, 20U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (2000). These
provisions, perhaps influenced by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee
County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 745 S. Ct. 686 (1954), incorporated a "pure" civil
rights approach. See Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1394-95.
130. Richard Scotch observed that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was
"not the result of the efforts of a social movement or of traditional interest group
politics but rather the result of a spontaneous impulse by a group of Senate aides
who had little experience with or knowledge about the problem of discrimination
against disabled people." Scotch, Good Will, supra note 91, at 139.
131. See Statement of President Bush, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601 (July 26, 1990)(noting that "existing language and standards from the Rehabilitation Act were
incorporated into the ADA."); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645, 118 S. Ct.
2196, 2208 (1998) (Congress in the ADA adopted the "administrative and judicial
interpretations" of the Rehabilitation Act.)
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3. The Operation of Paternalistic Models of Disability in the
ADA
In the ADA, Congress made minor adjustments-greatly over-
dramatized by ADA proponents-that are fully consistent with the
Rehabilitation Act approach. Throughout the Congressional findings,
substantive provisions, and implementing regulations, the ADA, like
its predecessor statute, compromises its civil rights potential and
displays the persisting residue of views associated with the medical
and social pathology models. Despite its recognition of the
widespread discrimination faced by disabled individuals, the ADA
reiterates the two notions associated with the medical and social
pathology models: inferiority and nonproductivity. Although slightly
more covert, the paternalistic nature of the policy is nonetheless
evident, being embodied both implicitly in the language used and
explicitly by way of limitations on the liberties provided. Hence, the
rights provided in the ADA are diluted by philosophies of inferiority
and nonproductivity which particularly lend themselves to
paternalistic interpretation.
a. Rhetoric and Its Contradictions
The ADA incorporates much of the rhetoric and structure of
previous civil rights enactments.'32 By referring to people with
disabilities as "a discrete and insular minority," historically relegated
to a position of "political powerlessness" in our society, the
Congressional findings adopted the rhetoric associated with legal
remedies for violations of civil rights. 133 The Act uses the term
"discrimination" to refer to employment decisions which unlawfully
take into account an applicant or employee's disabled status and
further incorporates the remedial and administrative structure of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.134 However, the Congressional findings
contradict this rhetoric by expressly adopting notions of biological
inferiority. In the statement of purposes, Congress declares its goal
of eradicating discrimination against individuals with disabilities
"based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of [their] individual ability . . . to participate in, and
contribute to, society.' 135 Referencing discrimination in the previous
132. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA and the Civil Rights
Model, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 19, 32 (2000).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2000).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
2003] NOTES
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
specific terms reiterates that disability is a mark of inferiority:
"removing the element of 'fault' from the 'characteristics' of people
with disabilities is an acknowledgment that something 'wrong' exists
within the individual, albeit not by choice or design of the individual,
that ought to be fixed.' 36 This characterizes disability in terms of the
medical and social pathology models, and renders the view that
discrimination in this context is a result of inferiority seemingly
inescapable. The Congressional findings add, however, that
stereotypic assumptions and miscalculations of the ability of disabled
persons also contribute to the discrimination. This frames the
obstacles faced by the disabled as a confusing mix of inferiority,
based on uncontrollable substandard characteristics, as well as
discrimination based on stereotypes and miscalculations. Thus, in
recognizing the widespread discrimination against persons with
disabilities, the purpose section of the ADA suggests that the causes
of the discrimination are somewhat understandable, as a logical result
of the inferiority of the disabled individual, yet indefensible, when
based on stereotypes and prejudicial animus. Resultantly, disability,
framed in terms of inferiority, is itself still viewed as a significant
cause of the discrimination, and the political powerlessness
experienced by the disabled is, strangely and simultaneously, both
justified and unjustified.'37
The Congressional findings further combine civil rightsjustifications with justifications for disability policies that developed
under the medical and social pathology models. The findings state
that "the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary
discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those
opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and
costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.' ' 38 This statement
melds notions of equal opportunity with aspirations of national
productivity, suggesting that the former is not reason enough to
justify a bill prohibiting discrimination against the disabled.'39 In
other words, in order to justify imposing the civil rights of the
disabled upon the nondisabled majority, Congress felt it necessary to
demonstrate that it made good economic sense to grant this class of
individuals equality. Justifying freedom from discrimination in
economic terms expressly invokes the theme of nonproductivity
associated with the medical and social pathology models. Hence,
136. Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1399.
137. Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1399.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (2002).
139. See Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1400.
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economic efficiency, rather than constitutional rights, endures as a
major touchstone of federal disability legislation. "
b. Perpetuation of Discarded Philosophies
The substantive provisions of the ADA further reflect the
philosophy of the medical and social pathology models both
semantically and tangibly. The ADA's definition of disability is
imported directly from its predecessor statute, the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, only substitutin, the word "disabled" for the Rehabilitation
Act term "handicapped." " Consequently, the ADA reintroduces all
of the problems associated with recognizing the inherent inferiority
of the disabled individual as a major source of the obstacles being
addressed and, more importantly, as a prerequisite to gaining the
protections of the Act. The disabled individual is not eligible for
coverage under the ADA unless he can demonstrate that he is
substantially impaired in one or more major life activities. Phrased
in these terms, the ADA's definition of disability continues the
traditional focus of disability policies by emphasizing the
characteristics of the person being discriminated against, rather than
the existence of discrimination. Judicial concentration, under the
ADA, on the technical distinctions about how much impairment
makes a person disabled and, specifically, on defining "major life
activity," is directly attributable to this definitional framework. This
statutory focus on the inward characteristics of the disabled person
has engendered a climate in which many claims of disability
discrimination are decided solely by looking at the characteristics of
140. It should be noted that economic efficiency was also a major argument in
favor of prohibiting race discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Arguments of economic efficiency have been characterized as relying on an
"economic model." The goal of the economic model is "to promote the economic
self-sufficiency of individuals with disabilities by increasing their participation in
compensated labor;" however, the organizing principle underlying economic
models is economic efficiency. Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning
and Function of the Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 Yale L.
& Pol'y Rev. 1, 8-9 (1999). As such, economic models are poorly suited to
accomplishing the goal of integrating disabled Americans into the workplace.
Under such an approach, if the cost of accommodation outweighs the benefit to
business then employers should not be required to accommodate the disabled
worker. See, e.g., Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives vs. Controls in Federal Disability
Policy, in Disability & Work: Incentives, Rights, and Opportunities 3 (Carolyn L.
Weaver, ed., 1991). Cf. Sue A. Krenek, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72
Tex. L. Rev. 1969 (1994).
141. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws
in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 335, 343 (2001) [hereinafter
"Tucker"] (noting that the term "handicapped" was "viewed as describing one who
held his cap in hand, asking for charitable assistance.").
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the plaintiff. '42 More damagingly, however, the perpetual focus on the
inherently inferior condition of the disabled individual contributes to
the idea that the disabled are fundamentally unequal and in need of
"special" protection. This special or preferential treatment mentality
contravenes the purpose of antidiscrimination laws, which are
premised on a guarantee of equality rather than special services
reserved for a select few.'43 Like its predecessor statute, the definition
incorporated into the ADA reinforces stereotypical assumptions that
the disabled are an inherently vulnerable and inadequate class of
persons in need of special protections. Thus, as one scholar aptly
stated,
[E]mpowering this "weak" group with legal rights and
remedies is partially a charitable act designed to compensate
for individual shortcomings, and not an explicit recognition
of constitutional equal rights. Of course, treating [the ADA]
as an act of charity makes the limitations on the rights more
palatable. After all, some rights are better than none at all.'"
c. Trumping of Rights Individually Based on Employer
Financial Hardship
Accordingly, the ADA severely limits the primary right that it set
out to provide: the right to equal access. In the context of disability,
accommodations are widely understood as requisite before any
purported grant of equality can be actualized.' Indeed, for the
majority of disabled individuals, a failure to provide accommodations
inevitably results in exclusion. The Congressional findings
aggressively pronounce that such exclusion is patently discriminatory.
However, this right of accommodation is subsequently limited by its
142. Robert L. Burgdorfcompares this focus on the inherent characteristics of
the disabled to placing the victim on trial, rather than the defendant:
The intense focus on the abilities and impairments of the complainant
instead of on the allegedly discriminatory conduct of the employer is
reminiscent of the complaint leveled at investigations and trials of rape
and other sexual offense charges-that the alleged victim is often on trial
rather than the alleged perpetrator.
Robert L. Burgdorf, 'Substantially Limited' Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the
Definition ofDisability, 42 Vill. L. Rev. 409,561 (1997) [hereinafter "Burgdorf'].
143. Burgdorf, supra note 142, at 568.
144. Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1399.
145. But see, infrit, section IV(B) of this note, which further examines and,
ultimately, questions the propriety of the accommodationist provisions of the ADA
in light of normative considerations of the proper scope of civil rights law and the
unintended consequences that expansively drafted accommodationist provisions
may be responsible for creating.
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persistent twin concept, "undue hardship." Hence the ADA, like
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act-and consistent with the
compromised, diluted nature of the rights provided elsewhere in the
Act-measures the right of accommodation against the resultant
financial hardship to employers. Accommodations need not be
provided if doing so would place an "undue" financial burden on the
employer's business. 146 The undue hardship provision, defined as "an
action requiring significant difficulty or expense,"147 thus continues
the tradition of disability legislation in America. With the use of
seductive civil rights rhetoric, Congress asserts aggressive rights only
to predicate entitlement to such "rights" on financial considerations
of relative cost and benefit. 4  Rather than providing specific
guidance as to the implementation of these confusing, seemingly
contradictory concepts, Congress simply suggests, as they had done
elsewhere, that what constitutes a reasonable accommodation should
be determined on a case by case basis. 149  Sacrificing rights to
financial concerns, however, is no less discriminatory and insincere
when done on an individualized basis, than when done on a
generalized and systematic basis by businesses seeking to mitigate the
costs of employing an "expensive" class of persons. In other words,
if disability plaintiffs are fortunate enough to reach this stage of
litigation, the compromise between cost and the right of
accommodation provides a glaring opportunity for employers to
ignore the antidiscrimination mandate of the Act and maintain the
status quo evident prior to its enactment. Disability discrimination is
frequently a product of considerations of cost and financial burden.
By expressly recognizing this barrier to equality as an escape from
complying with the basic antidiscrimination principle of the Act, the
ADA so severely compromises its method that it appears
disingenuous in its mandate. 50
146. See 42 U.S.C.§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000).
148. Some scholars argue that the very use of the term "reasonable"
accommodation suggests that society merely tolerates people with disabilities. See,
e.g., Drimmer, supra note 90, at 1406.
149. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303; S. Rep. No. 116, at 31 (1989).
150. See also, Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating "Undue
Hardship" Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 Tulsa L.J. 1, 3
(1990) ("The ADA's open-ended undue hardship defense provisions thus constitute
an invitation to regulators and judges to impose their values in the disability rights
context."); Bonnie O'Day, Economics versus Civil Rights, 3 Cornell J. L & Pub.
Pol'y 291, 300-301 (1994) (arguing for a "third wave message" to inform disability
policy that would focus primarily on "civil rights for persons with disabilities...
with the understanding that some accommodations for persons with severe
disabilities may be expensive and that an analysis based only on costs and benefits
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d. Direct Threat Paternalism
The concept of "reasonable accommodation" enters the ADA in
yet another definition, that of direct threat. As noted previously, the
term "direct threat" is defined in the ADA as a "a significant risk to
the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation," and a requirement that an individual not pose such
a threat may be included as a job qualification. 5 The regulation
implementing this provision simply extends the general philosophy
of the ADA to flesh out the details of its meaning. As noted
previously, the EEOC regulation at issue in Echazabal added to the
ADA's direct threat definition the possibility that an individual may
pose a danger to himself' The regulation, thus, substitutes the
employer's decision assessing the danger to the disabled individual
for the employee or applicant's decision, under at least the premise of
preventing the disabled individual from harming himself.' This is
obvious paternalism. Nonetheless, this paternalism is a logical result
of the persistent paternalistic philosophy that has marked disability
legislation in America for over 80 years. It should come as little
surprise that the ADA - operating from the fundamental premise that
the disabled are inherently flawed, justifying its pronouncements in
economic terms, and limiting the rights provided by their respective
economic burden on employers - would be interpreted by the EEOC
in a paternalistic fashion that minimizes the cost of employing
potentially "expensive" persons. Paternalistic attitudes are a natural
extension ofpersistent assumptions concerning the alleged biological
inferiority of people with disabilities. Paternalism is implicitly
sanctioned in the ADA under the guise of helping a class of inferior
unproductive persons realize their proper goal of economic
productivity. Hence, in the spirit of the paternalistic philosophy
implicit throughout the ADA, the Echazabal Court unanimously
found that the explicit paternalism evident in the EEOC regulation was
to employers may incorrectly suggest that some societally beneficial
accommodations should not be provided.").
151. 42U.S.C. § 12111(3)(2000).
152. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2000) ("Direct Threat means a significant risk
of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation... ") (emphasis added).
153. The Rehabilitation Act cases routinely held that a person who, in doing a
job, would pose a substantial risk to "the health or safety of the individual or others"
is not "qualified." Those include cases in which the principal risk is to the
employee himself. See, e.g., Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th
Cir. 1991) (applying the legal rule that "a significant risk of personal injury can
disqualify a handicapped individual from a job"); Knapp v. Northwestern Univ.,
101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a student with a heart condition is not
qualified under the Rehabilitation Act for a university sports program solely
because of the risk that he would die).
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permissible because it required an individualized assessment of the
potential risk to the applicant or employee in question. This is a natural
extension of the philosophy incorporated directly into the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and reincorporated into the ADA both
semantically (through the use of language portraying the disabled as an
inherently vulnerable and inferior class of persons) and substantively
(through considerations of economic efficiency which severely
compromise its civil rights rhetoric)." The uproar by disability
proponents following the promulgation of this regulation and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the direct threat defense in
Echazabal is, to some extent, like balking at the gnat after having
already swallowed the camel.
Obviously, however, concerns over paternalistic approaches to
disability policy are well-founded. Covert paternalism permeating the
ADA serves to perpetuate the discriminatory impediments to equality
faced by persons with disabilities. Indeed, paternalistic sentiments may
be more damaging to the advancement of the rights of people with
disabilities than would outright hostility. As Professor Hahn aptly
stated, "Paternalism... engenders a climate of deceit and hypocrisy
that makes it difficult for leaders of the disability rights movement to
challenge the opinions of non-disabled professionals who claim to be
acting in the best interests of this beleaguered minority.""'
154. Moreover, the Supreme Court has manifested paternalistic sentiments in a
variety of opinions related to disability issues. In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985), Justice White, writing for the
majority, extensively evaluated whether or not legal distinctions based on disability
should be constitutionally suspect under the Equal Protection clause. He suggested
that the condition of disabled persons, who possess a "reduced ability to cope with
and function in the everyday world," inevitably necessitates their reliance on others.
Id. at 442, 105 S. Ct. at 3255. Furthermore, he intimated that this reliance on others
was sufficient to eliminate any serious risk that the disabled might need to challenge
action taken contrary to their best interests: "[b]oth State and Federal Governments
have recently committed themselves to assisting the [disabled] .. .we will not
presume that any given legislative action, even one that disadvantages [disabled]
individuals, is rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate." Id.
at 446, 105 S. Ct. at 3257. Hence, "the concept of paternalism played a pivotal role
in the decision by the Supreme Court which denied the disabled minority
heightened scrutiny under the Constitution." Hahn, supra note 96, at 183.
Additionally, in Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982),
Justice Powell concluded that treatment imposed on a disabled plaintiff was
generally acceptable as long as it reflected the judgment of a qualified expert. See
Hahn, supra note 96, at 183. Powell explained that the "decision, if made by a
professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." Youngberg,
457 U.S. at 323, 102 S. Ct. at 2462.
155. Hahn, supra note 96, at 181.
2003] NOTES 549
L 0 UISIANA LAW RE VIEW
The ADA's confusing combination of enduring paternalistic
sentiments with the rhetoric of civil rights enactments is largely
attributable to the failure of the disabled to effectively refute
allegations of biological inferiority which entrench views that
produce paternalistic policies. Most judicial decisions interpreting
disability policies steadfastly cling to the problematic suggestion that
the problems of disabled citizens are a direct result of their biological
impairments. From this foundation, it should be no surprise that the
ADA is oftenjudicially viewed as a burdensome statute whose scope
is continually subject to limitation.
The struggle to rebut implicit and explicit charges of inferiority
is a process with which other minority groups have had to contend in
order to ultimately secure legal protection. Particularly, policies
impacting women, as well as judicial interpretations of such policies,
were, until recently, pervaded by remarkably patriarchal and
paternalistic stereotypes.1 6 As Justice Brennan graphically stated,
discrimination against women traditionally "was rationalized by an
attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which in practical effect, put
women not on a pedestal, but in a cage."?" Similarly for disabled
persons, the notion of inherent biological inferiority contributes to
ideas that disabled people are "quite different from others and need
special help and protection."' 58 A strong argument can be made that
the ADA is permeated by concepts of paternalism entangled with the
rhetoric of civil rights in a manner that is considered "outmoded" in
the context of sex discrimination.'59 Consequently, the experience of
and the theories that have developed concomitant with the sex
equality movement are particularly relevant in understanding and
reformulating acivil rights approach to disability discrimination that
could finally break with its chronicle of paternalistic protection.
B. An Alternative Approach to Biological Variance
Disability and sex share a defining quality: both are a biological
variant from an apparently dominant norm. Consequently, the
inherent biological "difference" of sex presents perplexing difficulties
similar to those associated with the biological "difference" of
disability. In the context of employment, women are commonly
confronted with obstacles resulting from a workplace defined by and
according to the needs of men. Likewise, disabled persons are faced
156. See Hahn, supra note 96, at 171.
157. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1769 (1973)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
158. Burgdorf, supra note 142, at 568.
159. See generally, Silvers & Stein, supra note 114, at 85.
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with obstacles inherent in a workplace defined by and for the
nondisabled majority. Moreover, the development and history ofboth
the feminist movement and the disability movement demonstrate
striking similarities. The history of sex discrimination, like disability
discrimination, evidences the notion that a certain class ofpersons are
in need of special protections due to distinctive vulnerabilities that
they face. Given these similarities, the experience of the women's
equality movement is particularly applicable to the disability debate.
1. The Evolution of Sex Discrimination Theory
Among classes of persons to receive civil rights protection,
women were nearly last in line. Until relatively recently, women
could not hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own
names; and married women traditionally were denied the legal
capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of
their own children.'" While African-Americans were guaranteed the
right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right until
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later. The right
to vote is understood to be preservative of other basic civil and
political rights. Hence, the growing recognition of women's socio-
economic significance and independence is a fairly recent
phenomenon.
The early history of the women's movement stands in sharp
contrast to the progress made by modem theories of equality applied
to the biological difference of sex. Early jurisprudence addressing
questions of sex equality was infused with what has now been termed
"romantic paternalism... These paternalistic notions characterized
discriminatory impediments to women's equality through a
framework that focused on women's inherent vulnerability and need
for special protection.'62 For example, in Muller v. Oregon, the
Supreme Court upheld a law limiting the amount of time worked by
women in laundries, while explicitly recognizing that similar
legislation affecting males might be unconstitutional.6 3 In order to
160. See generally, L. Kanowitz, Women and the Law: The Unfinished
Revolution 5-6 (1969); G. Myrdal, An American Dilemma 1073 (20th Anniversary
ed. 1962).
161. See supra text accompanying note 157.
162. See generally, J. Baer, The Chains of Protection: The Judicial Response to
Women's Labor Legislation 14-106 (1978).
163. 208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324(1908). The Court cited Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905), in which the Court found that a law limiting the
amount of permissible work time in bakeries was not, "as to men, a legitimate
exercise of the police power of the state, but an unreasonable, unnecessary, and
arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract in
2003]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
justify this paternalistic protection, the Court resorted to arguments
about the inherent frailty of women: "woman's physical structure, and
the functions she performs in consequence thereof, justify special
legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which she
should be permitted to toil."' 64
Notions of justified protection and guardianship over women
persisted long after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16  For
example, the Supreme Court, in Bradwell v. People of State of
Illinois,'" found that a refusal by the courts of a state to admit a woman
to practice law did not violate the Constitution. Ideas of paternalistic
protection were so firmly rooted and widely accepted that one member
of the Bradwell Court was able to proclaim:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which
is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature
of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests
relation to his labor, and as such was in conflict with, and void under, the Federal
Constitution." Id. at 419, 28 S. Ct. at 325. The Court dismissed the arguments based
on Lochner as wrongly assuming that "the difference between the sexes does not
justify a different rule respecting a restriction of the hours of labor." Id. The law
in question in Muller carried with it a criminal penalty for violations.
164. 208 U.S. at 420, 28 S.Ct. at 326. The Court further stated:
[H]istory discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon
man... As minors, though not to the same extent, she has been looked
upon in the courts as needing especial care that her rights may be
preserved ... Though limitations upon personal and contractual rights
may be removed by legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits
of life which will operate against a full assertion of those rights.
Id.
165. For example, thirty years after Muller, the Supreme Court, in Goesaert v.
Cleary, upheld, as obvious, the constitutionality of a Michigan statute requiring the
licensing ofall bartenders, but providing that no female could be licensed unless she
was the wife or daughter of a male owner of a licensed liquor establishment. 335
U.S. 464, 69 S. Ct. 198 (1948). In fact, most courts prior to 1950 found that
statutes which forbade the sale of liquor to women in certain establishments, the
employment of females in some businesses dispensing liquor, or even the presence
of women in such places were constitutional as a reasonable exercise of the state's
police power to protect the public safety, welfare and morals. See e.g., Randles v.
Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 206 P.2d 1209 (Wash. 1949); Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Mayor & Commissioners of Danville, 11 N.E.2d 388 (Ill. 1937);
Laughlin v. Tillamook County, 147 P. 547 (Or. 1915); People v. Case, 116 N.W.
558 (Mich. 1908); Hoboken v. Greiner, 53 A. 693 (N.J. 1902). A rational basis test
was applied to such laws until the 1970s.
166. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
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and views which belong, or should belong, to the family
institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a
distinct and independent career from that of her husband...
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law
of the Creator. 1
6 7
This statutorily imposed and judicially sanctioned denial of
equality to women sparked a fury among women's rights advocates
that led to the establishment of a distinctive body of scholarship and
theory to address the inequality burdening women. Feminist legal
scholars struggled to educate decisionmakers and the public that
something was wrong with their perception of the world. " In doing
so, scholars were forced to wrestle with the difficulties associated
with structuring a model of equality that could be applied to inherent
biological differences. Consequently, research in this arena has
produced a rich variety of theoretical perspectives that have largely
redefined discrimination theory. Particularly, feminist legal scholars
have advanced theories that understand biological "difference" as a
relative concept defined by its relationship to a dominant norm, and
have taken great strides toward uncovering institutional norms and
patterns that exclusively reflect and reinforce the values of that
dominant norm. 169 The increased awareness, debate, and multifaceted
167. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
168. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for the Celebration of 75 Years of
Women's Enrollment at Columbia Law School, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1441, 1442
(2002).
169. Numerous theories have developed during the progress of the women's
equality movement. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48
Ala. L. Rev. 861, 867 (1997). Equality theory, which is grounded in the idea that
women are functionally indistinguishable from men, and that discrimination occurs
when they are treated as if they were different, is supported by advocates such as
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and scholars such as Wendy Williams. Increased
awareness of the difficulties associated with structuring a model of equality that
would account for issues that highlight women's biological differences, such as
pregnancy, led to the rise of a "difference theory" of equality, which incorporates
a non-equivalent model that focuses on, and demands the accommodation of, sex
differences. See, id. at 869-70. This theory is supported by feminists like Leslie
Bender, Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Chris Littleton. Id. A more recent feminist
legal theory, dominance theory, emerged to address, among other things, the
criticism that difference theory revived a focus on "separate spheres," which
associated women with, and only with, reproduction, child-rearing and nurturing.
Critics such as Catharine MacKinnon argued that the fundamental limitation ofboth
equality and difference theories is their suggestion that women's inequality can be
traced to something inherent in them, rather than something done to them. See
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 32,40-41 (1987). Dominance
theorists assert that institutional norms and patterns purposefully reflect male values
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and innovative approaches that developed during the women's
equality movement inevitably found their way into more recent
jurisprudence brought under the Equal Protection clause, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and related statutes.
2. Modern Approaches to Sex Discrimination
In the 1971 case of Reed v. Reed, the Supreme Court, for the first
time in our nation's history, ruled in favor of a woman who
complained that her state had denied her the equal protection of its
laws. 70 Since Reed, the Court has repeatedly recognized that a law
or policy that denies equal opportunity to women, simply because
they are women, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution. 71 The passage of Title VII in 1964 also signaled
a command that employers would be held liable for any failure to
treat women equally in the workforce. Justice Brennan announced
that "[i]n passing Title VII Congress made the simple but momentous
announcement that sex . .. [is] not relevant to the selection,
evaluation or compensation of employees." '72 However, the model
employed by Congress to enact the Title VII prohibition against sex
discrimination is decidedly different than the model later utilized in
the ADA. In order to expose this divergence, it is necessary to first
understand the distinctive antidiscrimination framework incorporated
into Title VII.
a. Overview of Title VII
Title VII broadly applies to all units of local government and
private companies employing at least 15 workers, 173 and generally
and serve to entrench the subordination of women to the point that women
ultimately see themselves as men do. Id.
170. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,92 S. Ct. 251 (1971) (holding unconstitutional
an Idaho Code prescription requiring that, among persons equally entitled to
administer a decedent's estate, males must be preferred to females).
171. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973)
(holding it unconstitutional to deny female military officers housing and medical
benefits covering their husbands on the same automatic basis as those family
benefits were accorded to male military officers for their wives); Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459-63, 101 S. Ct. 1195, 1198-1200 (1981) (affirnming
invalidity of Louisiana law that made husband "head and master" ofpropertyjointly
owned with his wife, giving him the unilateral right to dispose of such property
without his wife's consent); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975)
(invalidating Utah requirement that parents support boys until age 21, girls only
until age 18).
172. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1784
(1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
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declares it unlawful to discriminate against otherwise similarly
situated employees and applicants on the basis of certain protected
characteristics.' 74  An employer who treats or evaluates an
individual on the basis of characteristics proscribed by the Act-
i.e. race, color, sex, religion, and national origin-has engaged in
conduct violative of Title VII.'
Covered employees,' 76  believing that they have been
discriminated against on the basis of a characteristic protected by
Title VII, may proceed under either of two available theories of
liability - disparate impact or disparate treatment - depending upon
the intent or motive of the alleged perpetrator. Disparate treatment
claims allege that an employer intentionally discriminated against
a covered employee on the basis of a protected characteristic.
Hence, in order to establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment, an employee must offer proof of discriminatory
motive.' Once the plaintiff presents a prima facie case of
discrimination, the defendant must present "some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for the action in question. 178 However,
even after the defendant produces a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason, the plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating that the
proffered reason was merely a pretext for intentional
174. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(l).
175. Title VII provides that it is unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin... ." Id. at § 2000e-2(a).
The statute further makes it unlawful to limit, segregate or classify employees or
applicants, so as to deprive protected individuals of employment opportunities or
adversely affect their employment status. Id.
176. Under Title VII the term "employee" is circularly defined as "an individual
employed by an employer." Id. § 2000e(f). The Supreme Court has interpreted this
to mean "the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-
law agency doctrine." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23,
112 S. Ct. 1344, 1348 (1992), citing, Cmty. for Creating Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 739-40, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2172 (1989).
177. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46, 109
S. Ct. 2115,2119 (1989); Burwell v. E. Airlines, 633 F.2d 361,369 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S. Ct. 1480 (1981). Frequently, plaintiffs seeking
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination proceed under the framework set
out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S. Ct. 1817 (1973), and its progeny. Accordingly, a plaintiff may demonstrate a
prima facie case of discrimination upon showing that (1) he or she is a member of
a protected class; (2) he or she applied for an available position; (3) he or she was
qualified, yet rejected; and (4) after his or her rejection, the position remained open.
See id. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains, at all
times, with the plaintiff, while the defendant's burden is one of production only. Id.
178. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824.
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discrimination. 179 A disparate impact claim alleges, in contrast, that
certain employment practices or policies in place by the employer
have a disproportionately discriminatory effect upon the class to
which the plaintiff belongs. Unlike disparate treatment, disparate
impact claims do not entail a requirement of intentional
discrimination.
Title VII explicitly provides two available affirmative defenses
through which an allegedly discriminatory practice may bejustified:
(1) business necessity (to defend claims of disparate impact), and
(2) bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) (to defend claims
of disparate treatment). The business necessity defense, codified in
subsection 703(k)(1) of Title VII as a result of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, requires the employer to articulate a legitimate business
reason for policies that adversely and disproportionately impact a
given group of employees.' The BFOQ defense does not apply as
an exception to employer discrimination based upon race, but does
explicitly apply to sex.18 ' An employer will only be successful in
asserting a valid BFOQ defense where the discriminatory
employment practice in question is "reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."'
8 2
179. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S. Ct. 2742,
2749 (1993).
180. Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994); see also Toni Scott
Reed, Flight Attendant Furies: Is Title VII Really the Solution to Hiring Policy
Problems?, 58 J. Air L. & Corn. 267, 335-36 (1992) (discussing how the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 codified the business necessity defense and clarified that the
burden of proving the defense rested with the employer). Even after the defendant
employer sufficiently demonstrates business necessity, the plaintiff may still
demonstrate that another employment practice - which would not produce such a
disproportionately discriminatory effect -is available to the employer, in which case
the defendant's failure to adopt this practice will result in liability under Title VII.
See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Law 217-18
(1997).
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994) ("[lIt shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees.., on the basis
of... sex.., where.., sex.., is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise... "); see
also Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of
the Defense to Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 5, 10 (1991)
[hereinafter "Befort"]. The EEOC guidelines emphasize the limited nature of the
exception and add that it should not be applied in situations including "[tihe refusal
to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes," and "[t]he
refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of co-workers, the employer,
clients or customers except .. . [w]here it is necessary for the purpose of
authenticity or genuineness . . . e.g., an actor or actress." 29 C.F.R. §
1604.2(a)(l)(ii)-(iii), § 1604.2(a)(2)(2000).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2002).
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b. Rejection of the Stubborn Paternalistic Assumption
Remarking on the significant advances made by the women's
rights movement, one federal court of appeals judge has stated that
enactments targeting women under the guise of paternalistic
protection are now "museum pieces, reminders of wrong turns in the
law.' ' 18 3 However, the advances in the disability rights movement do
not parallel the progress of the women's rights movement. As noted
previously, the ADA falls short of granting full equality to disabled
persons in three ways: (1) by defining disability as a condition of
inherent inferiority that leads to the conclusion that the disabled are
fundamentally unequal, (2) by justifying the granting of equality in
economic terms, leading to the conclusion that its pronouncements
are notjustifiable on civil rights grounds alone, and (3) by making the
rights provided in the statute dependent on economic considerations
of relative cost and benefit through provisions such as "undue
hardship" and "reasonableness." The success of Title VII from purely
a statutory framework is at least partially attributable to its departure
from each of these shortcomings.
At the outset, Title VII's anti-sex-discrimination mandate
characterizes sex along with other conditions or categorizations
which are, for the most part, popularly understood to have no bearing
whatsoever on an individual's merit and capability as an employee:
race, color, national origin, and religion. Title VII clearly does not
operate from the fundamental premise that women are inherently
inferior or flawed as compared to men. In contrast, the ADA lumps
together mental and physical conditions defined as "impairments,"
which are popularly understood to have considerable bearing on an
individual's capability and merit. Consequently, as distinguished
from employees proceeding under Title VII, disabled plaintiffs must
endure the arduous process of proving their inferiority, and thus their
fundamental inequality, in order to establish protection under the
ADA.
Additionally, the rights provided in Title VII are not limited by
their respective economic burden on employers. As our Supreme
Court has powerfully stated, "[t]he extra cost of employing members
of one sex ... does not provide an affirmative Title VII defense for
a discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gender."' a
183. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 913 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting); rev'd, 499 U.S. 187, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
184. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210, 111 S. Ct. at 1209. The Johnson
Controls Court further stated, "[i]ndeed, in passing the PDA, Congress considered
at length the considerable cost of providing equal treatment of pregnancy and
related conditions, but made the 'decision to forbid special treatment of pregnancy
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Accordingly, there is no corresponding "undue hardship" provision
in Title VII, but rather a recognition that equality, while not always
economically efficient, is mandated by considerations that preempt
notions of relative cost and benefit. As a result, the civil rights
granted to female employees by Title VII are not constrained by the
employer's pocketbook in the manner of the ADA."8 5
This absence of any provision of undue hardship with respect to
Title VII sex discrimination is frequently attributed to the
corresponding absence of an explicit requirement of accommodation
such as the "reasonable accommodation" provision of the ADA. 8 6 By
contrast, the ADA's accommodation mandate explicitly requires
private employers to incur specific, demonstrable costs to
accommodate disabled workers. It is argued that, as such, an upper
level cap on the cost of complying with the ADA is necessary to
prevent undue financial burden on private businesses. But the
argument that Title VII is not an accommodationist law-i.e. that it
does not require employers to incur specific, demonstrable costs in
response to the distinctive needs of a particular protected class'-
despite the social costs associated therewith."' Id., citing Arizona Governing
Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S.
1073, 1085 n. 14, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3499 n. 14 (1983) (opinion of Marshall, J.), Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). See also, Los
Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, at 716-18 & n.32, 98
S. Ct. 1370, 1379-80 & n.32 (1978) (concluding that the greater costs of providing
retirement benefits for female employees did not justify the use of a sex-based
retirement plan).
185. An argument may be made that, in a more limited sense, the BFOQ and
business necessity provisions of Title VII do take economic or financial
considerations into account. The Johnson Controls Court required a showing of the
employer's potential financial ruin in order to successfully invoke the BFOQ
defense. 499 U.S. at 201, 111 S. Ct. at 1204-05. In comparison, the business
necessity defense requires only a showing that the discriminating employment
practice is related to employee job performance. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S. Ct. 849, 853 (1971).
186. Indeed, with respect to Title VII religious accommodations, the only
explicit accommodation requirement present in Title VII, the economic burden on
employers is severely restricted under the de minimis standard, and an undue
hardship provision is included. Under this approach, any accommodation that
requires the employer to incur more than a slight cost would likely constitute an
undue hardship. Congress specifically rejected the de minimis standard in the
context of the ADA. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990); see also,
Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512 (2nd Cir. 1995) (cost ofparking spaces for
disabled Legal Aid attorney maybe a reasonable accommodation, although possibly
costing as much as $520 per month). See also, supra text accompanying note 44 and
infra text accompanying note 262.
187. See Jolls, supra note 14, at 648 (defining accommodation as "a legal rule
that requires employers to incur special costs in response to the distinctive needs (as
measured against existing market structures) of particular, identifiable demographic
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may be an oversimplification, as recent scholarship suggests that both
Title VII and the ADA might be viewed as accommodationist statutes
to some extent. Given the important consequences that resolution of
this debate poses for the future efficacy of the accommodationist
provisions of the ADA, this subject is relevant for discussion in this
note.
1) Antidiscrimination vs. Accommodation: Apples and
Oranges?
An employer is obviously required to incur specific demonstrable
costs in order to accommodate a disabled worker, such as a blind or
deaf employee who requires a reader or translator. However, the
costs associated with accommodation do not appear to be unique to
the ADA. Significant case law has imposed "accommodationist"
requirements as a matter of Title VII disparate impact law.'
Instances of parity between Title VII antidiscrimination and the
ADA's accommodation mandate were recently documented by
Professor Jolls. "9 Jolls notes that when Title VII "disparate impact
law prohibits facially neutral... rules that maximize an employer's
profits, this law is requiring an employer to 'alter the work
groups of employees, such as individuals with (observable) disabilities, and imposes
this requirement in circumstances in which the employer has no intention of treating
the group in question differently on the basis of group membership (or
'discriminating against' the group in the canonical sense).").
188. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 939 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1991)
(Eighth Circuit struck down an employer's no-beard rule on the ground that it had
a disproportionately negative effect on black men and was not justified by the
business necessity requirement ofdisparate impact law); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329-30, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2726-27 (1977) (noting that facially neutral
height and weight requirements tend to exert a disparate impact on women by
excluding them at a higher rate than men); Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d478 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1131, 120 S. Ct.
970 (2000) (reversing judgment in favor of employer after determining that an
employment screen requiring transit police officers who might have to apprehend
suspects on foot to run 1.5 miles in twelve minutes disproportionately disqualified
women and might not be justified by business necessity); see also, infra notes 192,
194, and 196, and the cases cited therein. Professor Jolls argues that disparate
impact cases of this sort are analogous to accommodation requirements because
they act to force employers to incur specific demonstrable costs in response to the
distinctive needs of a particular protected group, thereby affecting business' profit
maximizing behavior in a manner similar to well recognized "accommodationist"
laws such as the ADA and the FMLA. See Jolls, supra note 14, at 652-66.
189. Jolls, supra note 14. See also, Siegel, supra note 127 at 940-46; Krieger
& Cooney, supra note 127, at 559-60; Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and
Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 3-4 &
n.14 (2000).
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environment' in response to the circumstances of individuals who are
less effective employees from the employer's profit-maximizing
business perspective.' 90
Using sex discrimination as an illustration, the logic of Title VII
disparate impact liability requires employers to provide certain
benefits, such as leave from work, to pregnant female employees.' 9'
Several courts have held that facially neutral employer policies
permitting no or limited leave time for illness or disability, including
pregnancy, create an unlawful disparate impact on female
employees.'92 This provision of medical leave, even when it is unpaid
medical leave, requires employers to incur specific demonstrable
costs in order to respond to the distinctive circumstances of
women. 93 Additionally, under disparate impact logic, when an
190. Jolls, supra note 14, at 668.
191. See Jolls, supra note 14, at 660. See also, Deborah A. Calloway,
Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 Stetson L. Rev. 1, 39-40, 42-43(1995); Krieger & Cooney, supra note 127, at 525 & n.40, 559-60; Laura
Schlichtmann, Comment, Accommodation of Pregnancy- Related Disabilities on
the Job, 15 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 335, 370-88,403-04 (1994); Siegel, supra
note 127, at 940-46.
192. See, e.g., EEOC v. Warshawsky& Co., 768 F. Supp. 647,651-55 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (granted summary judgment against an employer on the ground that its policy
of discharging all first-year employees who requested long-term sick leave had a
disproportionately negative effect on women, because of their ability to become
pregnant, and was not justified by business necessity); Abraham v. Graphic Arts
Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 818-20 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reversed a grant of summary
judgment for an employer because a pregnant employee had shown that the
employer's ten-day leave limitation had a disparate impact on women and the
employer had not adequately defended its approach); Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r
of Labor & Indus., 692 P.2d 1243, 1251- 52 (Mont. 1984) (concluded that an
employer's no-leave policy for first-year employees had a disparate impact on
women), vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 1050, 107 S. Ct. 919,judgment and
opinion reinstated, 744 P.2d 871 (Mont. 1987); but see, Stout v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 282 F.3d 856 (5th Cir. 2002)(concluding that employee who had suffered a
miscarriage with additional complications during her 90-day probationary period,
and subsequently was fired, failed to prove that she was fired "because of' her
pregnancy). The EEOC guidelines likewise provide that the absence or inadequacy
of a leave policy may create an unlawful disparate impact on female employees. See
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (2000).
193. Following the enactment of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (2000)),
failure to provide medical leave time is independently unlawful. However, some
scholars have argued that leave time for pregnancy is not required by Title VII
unless such leave is offered for other health conditions. See, e.g., Maria O'Brien
Hylton, "Parental" Leaves and Poor Women: Paying the Price for Time Off 52
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 475, 506 n.138, 512 (1991); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1125 (1986). It appears that these scholars have entirely
ignored the disparate impact branch of Title VII. See Jolls, supra note 14, at 662-63
("It is almost as if the very existence of the disparate impact branch of liability
NOTES
employer offers employee health insurance benefits that cover
pregnancy and related medical conditions, that employer must also
offer such benefits to the spouses of male employees. T9 Failure to
either provide leave time or offer pregnancy benefits to female
spouses may reflect nothing more than the increased business cost
that it would entail. This is similar to an employer's failure to
willingly alter the working environment to accommodate the blind
or deaf employee.
Moreover, even under a disparate treatment analysis, one could
argue that Title VII's antidiscrimination mandate serves to impose
specific, identifiable costs on employers. The primary example here
involves an employer's reluctance to employ female applicants due
to a demonstrated customer preference for males. 95 Even given
such a demonstration, Title VII prohibits an employer's refusal to
hire female candidates to work with particular customers, despite
the fact that those customers have been shown to be highly reluctant
to work with a woman.' 96 As such, Title VII imposes identifiable
under Title VII is being ignored, often based on a reading of the second clause of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) that the Supreme Court appears,
in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra to have rejected."). In
Guerra, the Supreme Court found that the second clause of the PDA was intended
to overrule the holding in Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S. Ct. 401
(1976), "and to illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied."
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285, 107 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1987). The Guerra Court
characterized the PDA as "a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may
not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise." Id. In fact, the Reagan
Justice Department tried unsuccessfully to argue that disparate impact liability was
not available in the pregnancy context in the important Seventh Circuit case, Scherr
v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consolidated Dist. No. 50, 867 F. 2d 974 (7th Cir. 1988).
Even Richard Epstein, a Title VII minimalist, concludes that "it appears that the full
apparatus of disparate impact... would apply to pregnancy cases under the statute,
as it does to ordinary cases of sex discrimination." Epstein, supra note 126, at 349.
There is, however, some conflicting case law. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co.,
20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 583
(7th Cir. 2000); Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd., No. 93-C-4518,
1997 WL 285488, at *13 (N.D. I1l. May 19, 1997), af'd, 140 F.3d 716 (7th Cir.
1998). Professor Jolls argues that this case law cannot be squared with the larger
body of disparate impact law. See Jolls, supra note 14, at 663.
194. See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
103 S. Ct. 683 (1983) (holding that the PDA prohibits discrimination in
compensation terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of sex, and
that includes health insurance provided to employees and their spouses).
195. See Jolls, supra note 14, at 645.
196. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that customer preference which prevents customers from dealing with
the employer does not qualify as a BFOQ); see also, Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950, 97 S. Ct.
275 (1971); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 928, 100 S. Ct. 1865 (1980).
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costs on employers in order to effect compliance with its
antidiscrimination mandate.
Accordingly, Professor Jolls concludes that traits covered by Title
VII require-and in many cases receive-accommodation through the
operation of disparate impact liability, and in some cases through
disparate treatment liability.'97 Hence, while Title VII does not
explicitly state that accommodations are necessary to avoid liability,
under the logic of its requirements, accommodations are mandated
nonetheless. Jolls's research would suggest that the line between
antidiscrimination and accommodation is in fact blurred, and the two
are actually overlapping rather than fundamentally distinct categories.
This calls into question the criticism that the ADA incorporates "a
profoundly different model of equality from that associated with
traditional non-discrimination statutes like Title VII" since the ADA
requires that disabled individuals "be treated differently, arguably
better," than other workers. 19 Moreover, given the startling rates at
which ADA plaintiffs typically fail at the summary judgment stage,
it is necessary to question whether Title VII, rather than the ADA,
actually serves to grant broader protection from discrimination to its
protected classes, particularly women, and, if so, whether this
situation is justified. Significant to this examination are the Title VII
cases which examine employers' safety-based concerns and invalidate
paternalistic decisionmaking by the employer on the employee's
behalf.
2) Title VII Interpretations
As noted previously, the Title VII antidiscrimination framework,
largely influenced by the equivalency model predominating at the
time of its passage, demonstrates the notion that distinctions based on
sex are unfair and unnecessary because women are fundamentally
equal in every respect that should be relevant and, therefore, deserve
equal civil rights. Unlike the disabled, women as a class have, for the
most part, successfully refuted allegations of biological inferiority by
redefining their biological anomalies from a position that presupposes
incompetence to one that emphasizes their unique abilities and
fundamental equality. The women's movement has both redefined
"difference" as a relative concept that presumes a majority or
dominant norm and characterized all classifications based on sex as
inherently suspicious from an equal protection standpoint. Because
197. Jolls, supra note 14, at 668.
198. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword,--Backlash Against the ADA:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 3-4 (2000).
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women are perceived to be equal in every respect that should be
relevant, Title VII replaced paternalistic notions of inherent inferiority
with a forceful mandate for equality and independence. However, as
with all laws, the devil is in the details, and the true success of Title
VII's break from historically paternalistic treatment of women
dangled treacherously on the Court's interpretation of the BFOQ
defense in connection with safety-based employer concerns.
While significant jurisprudence demonstrates that the courts are
willing to interpret Title VII defenses in a fashion that would include
employers' reasonable concerns about workplace and public safety,
shortly after its enactment the Supreme Court had occasion to
address paternalistic "protection" of women in the workplace
through employment policies that prevented a female employee
from endangering herself. Dothard v. Rawlinson'99 and
International Union, UA Wv. Johnson Controls2°° involved Title VII
challenges to employer policies that excluded women, but not men,
from certainjobs in prisons (Dothard) and in battery manufacturing
plants (Johnson Controls). In both cases the issue was framed as
whether the exclusionary policy in question could be justified as a
bona fide occupational qualification. Both cases demonstrate that,
in the context of Title VII sex discrimination, the Supreme Court
has disallowed legitimate safety considerations which encompass a
risk to solely the individual claiming discrimination.
In Dothard the Supreme Court upheld an Alabama regulation
forbidding the hiring of female correctional counselors in contact
positions in all-male maximum security prisons. The Court found
sex to be a BFOQ because the very fact of womanhood could
undermine a woman's ability to maintain prison security. However,
in so ruling, the Court was clear to exclude considerations of the
woman's safety to herself as legitimate use of the BFOQ defense.
The Court stated: "In the usual case, the argument that a particular
job is too dangerous for women may appropriately be met by the
rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual
woman to make that choice for herself." '' The Court was clear that
the regulation in question could be upheld because "more [was] at
stake in this case.., than an individual woman's decision to weigh
and accept the risks of employment in a 'contact' position in a
199. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
200. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 111 S. Ct.
1196 (1991).
201. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335, 97 S. Ct. at 2730, citing Weeks v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232-36 (5th Cir. 1969); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1969); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
2003] NOTES
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
maximum-security male prison. 2 2  The Court rested their
determination of the existence of a BFOQ on the threat that a
female prison guard posed "to the basic control of the penitentiary
and protection of its inmates and the other security personnel., 2 3
Thus, Dothard stands for the proposition that "a BFOQ based on
safety grounds is appropriate only where the exclusion of one sex
is necessary to accomplish the performance of the employer's
primary business function. ' 204
The Court went even further in International Union, UA W v.
Johnson Controls,2°5 holding that an employer could not support a
cost-based BFOQ defense despite evidence suggesting increased tort
liability. The case involved a fetal exclusion policy that excluded all
fertile women from jobs with high lead exposure. The Court found
that the "incremental cost of hiring women" cannot excuse an
employer's discriminatory employment policy.206 Thus, the Court
stated that employers could not base a BFOQ defense on concerns
that were unrelated to women's performance of the essence of the
employer's business. 2 7 They addressed the "beneficent" motives
proffered for the policy, i.e. that the policy was intended to protect
women's reproductive health, and declared:
Whether an employment practice involves disparate treatment
through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why
the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of
the discrimination . . . [T]he motives underlying the
employers' express exclusion of women [does] not alter the
intentionally discriminatory character of the policy. Nor [do]
the arguably benign motives lead to consideration of a
business necessity defense . . . The beneficence of an
employer's purpose does not undermine the conclusion that
an explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under §
703(a) and thus may be defended only as a BFOQ... In sum,
Johnson Controls' policy "does not pass the simple test of
whether the evidence shows 'treatment of a person in a
manner which but for that person's sex would be
different. '208
202. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335, 97 S. Ct. at 2730.
203. Id. at 336, 97 S. Ct. at 2730.
204. Befort, supra note 181, at 30.
205. 499 U.S. 187, 111 S. Ct. 1196(1991).
206. Id. at 210, 111 S. Ct. at 1209.
207. Id. at 206-07, 111 S. Ct. at 1207.
208. Id. at 199-200, 111 S. Ct. at 1203-04 (emphasis added), quoting, Los
Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711, 98 S.Ct. 1370,
1377 (1978).
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As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the capacity of women to
make certain decisions for themselves, stating that "[ilt is no more
appropriate for the courts than it is for individual employers to decide
whether a woman's reproductive role is more important to herself and
her family than her economic role. Congress has left this choice to
the woman as hers to make.
' 209
These two decisions demonstrate that, in the context of Title VII,
"the 'safety exception' has been limited to instances in which sex or
pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to perform
the job."2 1' If the reasoning applied in these two cases had been
applied to the issue in Echazabal, a decidedly different result would
have been reached. The Echazabal Court emphasized that, in the
context of the ADA's direct threat defense, the employer's decision
not to hire the plaintiff is justified when based on an individualized
assessment of the disabled person's present ability to safely perform
the essential functions of the job. By contrast, the Court stated that
Title VII cases deal with "paternalistic judgments based on the broad
category of gender," not individualized medical assessment.2 1
Indeed, the history of sex-specific protectionist legislation
demonstrates that the argument for limitations on women's
employment was based, not on empirical evidence of special hazards
for women and their families, but on general assertions that the work
was dangerous and that considerations of the strength of women's
reproductive capacity and general health should prevail over women's
interest in wage work. 2  However, responses to such "protective"
statutes and policies recognized the troubling aspects of dismissing
out of hand the possibility that women might be competent
decisionmakers. Even if an individualized assessment had been
undertaken of the risk posed to the Johnson Controls and Dothard
plaintiffs, the language of those cases suggests that Title VII would
still serve to prohibit an employer from discriminating against a
woman in a paternalistic fashion that denied her the opportunity to
put herself at risk if she chose to do so. The underlying notion of
Title VII sex discrimination theory, which has evolved beyond its
early emphasis on paternalistic protection, is that the very paternalism
that is disguised as protection and aid can be used as a cage to trap
women in subordinate positions ultimately detrimental and
antithetical to their civil rights. As the Johnson Controls Court
209. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211, 111 S. Ct. at 1210.
210. Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies,
53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1219, 1253 (1986) [hereinafter "Becker"].
211. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 n.5, 122 S. Ct. 2045,
2053 n.5 (2002).
212. See Becker, supra note 210, at 1224.
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succinctly stated, "Congress has left this choice to the woman as hers
to make." '213 It is highly possible, as suggested in previous sections
of this note, that the Echazabal Court was responding to the fact that
Congress has not clearly left this choice to the disabled individual in
the context of the ADA.
As noted previously, the ADA defines disabled persons in a
manner that suggests a need for the implementation of special
protective policies on their behalf. Moreover, the economic focus of
the Act makes it clear that the rights provided are subject to economic
considerations of relative cost and benefit. Thus, both the definitional
framework and the economic thrust of the ADA illustrate an
approach to disability discrimination that diverges from that taken
with respect to sex discrimination. This approach lends itself to an
interpretation that restricts the disabled employee's autonomous
decisionmaking when the possibility for increased cost to the
employer or danger to the disabled individual arises. It also
uncovers several conspicuous notions that severely jeopardize
equality of opportunity for the disabled.
The direct threat-to-self defense, like sex-specific protectionist
legislation, fails to consider the effects of such policies on the
disabled. In the context of sex discrimination, protective
enactments and policies often focused on over-riding considerations
ofpublic health due to women's unique reproductive capacity. This
focus served to identify women with (and only with) inherent
characteristics of vulnerability and inferiority. Likewise, protective
policies restricting a disabled individual's freedom of choice
exaggerate their alleged vulnerability and inferiority. Ultimately,
these policies often serve to exclude only those persons who are
perceived as marginal workers and pose the risk of being used as
merely an excuse for what would otherwise be patently obvious
discrimination on the basis of characteristics protected by the ADA.
Furthermore, for both women and the disabled, such policies rely on
the assumption that the individual in need of protection is not a
competent decisionmaker. This assumption, while providing
evidence of the paternalistic approach taken by Congress in the
ADA, is particularly damaging to the disability movement.
However, the Echazabal Court revealed another justification
underlying their decision to recognize a direct threat-to-self defense
in the ADA context: OSHA liability. 14
213. Johnson Controls, 499 US at2ll, 111 S. Ct. at 1210.
214. See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84, 122 S. Ct. at 2052 ("[flocusing on the
concern with OSHA will be enough to show that the regulation is entitled to
survive.").
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3) The Possibility of OSHA and Tort Liabilities
In Johnson Controls, the Court recognized that "OSHA
established a series of mandatory protections which, taken together,
'should effectively minimize any risk to the fetus and newborn
child."'215  The Johnson Controls company claimed that
noncompliance with these standards would potentially expose them
to liability. However, the Court dismissed this argument by stating
that"[i]f... Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the
employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has
not acted negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable seems
remote at best., 21
6
In contrast, the Echazabal Court rested its justification for
Chevron's actions on the mere possibility of OSHA liability. The
Echazabal Court stated simply that "there is no denying that the
employer would be asking for trouble: his decision to hire would put
Congress's policy in the ADA, a disabled individual's right to operate
on equal terms within the workplace, at loggerheads with the
competin policy of OSHA, to ensure the safety of 'each' and 'every'
worker."2  The similarities in risk to the worker himself in
Echazabal and to both the worker and her potential offspring in
Johnson Controls are apparent. Clearly, the Johnson Controls Court
was not willing to rest on the mere possibility of liability. The Court
noted that, in the sex discrimination context, employers are forbidden
from "resorting to an exclusionary policy" as "a method of diverting
attention from [its] obligation to police the workplace. '2' In
Echazabal, it is worth noting that rather than identifying a specific
rule adopted by OSHA which required Chevron to exclude people
with hepatitis C from areas containing hydrocarbons, Chevron relied
only on the Act's "general duty" clause.2 " Neither Chevron nor the
government was able to identify a single case in which OSHA has
initiated a general duty clause enforcement action in similar
circumstances, likely because this clause imposes only a duty of
feasible prevention. 220 Hence, the reasoning of Johnson Controls appears
215. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 208, 111 S. Ct. at 1208; citing 43 Fed. Reg.
52,952, at 52,966 (1978); see 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k)(1)(ii) (1990).
216. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 208, 111 S. Ct. at 1208.
217. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2052
(2002).
218. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210, 111 S. Ct. at 1209.
219. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2002) ("Each employer-(1) shall furnish to
each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to his employees").
220. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,641,
2003] NOTES 567
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
particularly applicable: where the ADA prevents an employer from
excluding an employee with increased susceptibility to occupational
harm, and the employer discloses the relevant risks to that employee and
takes all feasible steps to mitigate those risks, the prospect that the
employer would face liability under that clause is likely "remote at best."
Obviously, this reasoning depends on a clear mandate from Congress
granting disabled persons the right to make decisions for themselves in
this context. Significantly, the Court's unanimous recognition of the
direct threat-to-self defense demonstrates that, in the ADA, Congress fell
far short of providing such an unambiguous declaration.
Regarding state tort liability, the Johnson Controls Court stated
simply that, "[w]hen it is impossible for an employer to comply with
both state and federal requirements, this Court has ruled that federal law
pre-empts that of the States." 22' Broadly addressing the fear of increased
cost, the Johnson Controls Court clearly stated, "[t]he extra cost of
employing members of one sex, however, does not provide an
affirmative Title VII defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire
members of that gender.' 222
Each of the troubling aspects of sex-specific protectionist legislation
recur in the contemporary debate over disability threat-to-self
qualification standards: the refusal to consider the effects of such policies
on the disabled, the identification of the disabled with (and only with)
inherent characteristics of vulnerability and inferiority, the perception of
disabled persons as marginal workers (which leads to their exclusion),
and the assumption that the disabled are not competent decisionmakers.
However, the progress made as a result of the women's equality
movement demonstrates that paternalistic protectionism can be
overcome.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
While the previous sections have been devoted to a critique of the
current version of the ADA, this final section offers two distinct
approaches to reforming the disability discrimination statute. The
100 S. Ct. 2844, 2863-64 (1980); Mark A Rothstein, Occupational Safety and
Health Law 207-208, 213-214, 215-216 (4th ed. 1998).
221. 499 U.S. at 209, 111 S. Ct. at 1209; citing Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 83 S. Ct. 1210 (1963); see also 499 U.S. at
210, 111 S. Ct. at 1209 ("If state tort law furthers discrimination in the workplace
and prevents employers from hiring women who are capable of manufacturing the
product as efficiently as men, then it will impede the accomplishment of Congress'
goals in enacting Title VII.").
222. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210, 111 S. Ct. 1209, citing Los Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-718 n. 32, 98 S. Ct. 1370,
1379-80 n.32 (1978).
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implications of these reforms are both theoretical and practical in
nature. Drawing from Title VII sex discrimination's break from
"outmoded" paternalistic logic, part A of this section seeks to
incorporate lessons learned through the course of the women's
equality movement. Against this backdrop, the three-part proposal
set forth in part A offers a clearer and more sincere approach to
disability discrimination in the workplace that has the potential to
finally break with its chronicle of paternalistic "protection." The
revisions represented in this proposal would forcefully declare that
protection from discrimination in this context is, indeed, a civil right
no less important than the right to be free from discrimination on the
basis of sex. The following section, part B, addresses the most
prominent counter-arguments (from both a theoretical and practical
standpoint) to the reform proposed in part A, and introduces an
alternative reform that would align the ADA more closely with
commonly-recognized (and perhaps theoretically justifiable)
"traditional" antidiscrimination mandates. In so doing, the reform in
part B would likewise insulate the statute from paternalistic
interpretation.
As mentioned in the introductory section of this note, the
proposals offered in parts A and B that follow represent two mutually
exclusive extremes along the spectrum of potential ADA reforms. At
one end of the spectrum, Congress could attempt to bolster the
presently diluted version of the ADA by strengthening and clarifying
the accommodationist duty and legislatively safeguarding the statute
from predictable judicial resistance. Alternatively, Congress may
view judicial resistance to core elements of the ADA as an indication
of a more fundamental flaw inherent in the statute, which stems from
the impossible coexistence of the explicit accommodationist duty
represented in the ADA within the framework of more "traditional"
antidiscrimination mandates. The following reforms allow for both
alternatives. Nonetheless, the premise for each proposal remains
consistent: immediate (and potentially extreme) reforms of the ADA
are imminently necessary to revive the once-heralded, and now
noticeably paralyzed, enactment.
A. Strengthening and Clarifying the Accommodationist Duty
As a favorite adage of pundits, historians, and columnists goes:
what we learn from history is how little we learn from history. A
sincere antidiscrimination statute forbidding disability discrimination
in the workplace should incorporate the lessons learned over the
course of the evolution of sex discrimination theory and policy. The
progress of the women's equality movement carried with it several
important teachings that are particularly applicable to disability
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discrimination: (1) biological variance does not necessitate or deserve
a finding of inherent inferiority; (2) notions of inherent inferiority
contribute to protective legislation and policies that, rather than
protect, serve only to entrench discriminatory barriers to equality; and
(3) achieving equality will not always be the most cost-effective
alternative, but it is imperative nonetheless.
1. Defining Biological Variance to Exclude Notions of Inherent
Inferiority
The ADA's current approach to disability discrimination is
fundamentally flawed because the definitional framework utilized in
the Act defines disability in a way that presupposes inferiority. The
Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination, on the other hand,
represents a definitional framework that characterizes women as
fundamentally equal in every respect that should be relevant. As
previously noted, sex is listed alongside characteristics such as race,
color, religion, and national origin, all of which are; for the most part,
accompanied by a widespread societal understanding that they have
virtually no impact on an individual's employability and merit.
Consequently, despite women's biological variance and particularly
unique circumstances, discriminatory impediments leading to their
inequality are analogized to discrimination excluding members of a
certain race, color, national origin, or religion. This facilitates a
popular understanding that discriminatory impediments to women's
equality are a result of external barriers, rather than internal
deficiencies. The recognition that women are inherently no less equal
than members of a certain race, color, religion, or national origin
inevitably spills over into interpretations of the Act, which forcefully
declare individual autonomy and invalidate paternalistic
decisionmaking on their behalf.
The definition of disabled persons as fundamentally and inherently
flawed likewise infects jurisprudence interpreting the ADA, but in the
opposite direction. ADA jurisprudence illustrates that conflicts
between Congress's confusing mix of civil rights rhetoric and
paternalistic notions of inherent inferiority are more often decided in
favor of the latter. The progress of the disability rights movement
depends on a popular understanding that disabled individuals are
equally entitled to the civil rights granted to other minorities. This goal
is thwarted by a definition of disability that characterizes the disabled
as inherently unequal. To further the teaching function of a civil rights223
enactment, an effective civil rights statute must clearly proclaim that
223. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Marriage, Family and the Positive Law, 10
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the inequality presently experienced by disabled persons results
exclusively from discriminatory external barriers to equality, and in no
way reflects internal deficient traits.
It is readily apparent, however, that defining "sex" may be
considerably simpler than defining "disability." Proscribing an
alternative definition of disability to address the problems cited above
is beyond the scope of this article, and more research into this arena is
clearly warranted. Perhaps, however, the most essential prerequisite to
change would be the divorce of mental and physical disabilities.224 The
disabled are a very diverse community both because of the many types
of physical and mental disabilities, and because a disability can happen
to anyone at any time, cutting across all gender, race, economic, and
other social divides. For this reason the ADA, as well as the bulk of
previous legislation, has attempted to announce unitary principles that
can be applied to both the mentally and physically disabled as a whole.
However, certain policies that may be justified with respect to the
mentally disabled find no corollary justification with respect to those
individuals who are physically disabled. For example, when the stakes
are high, as they are in dangerous employment positions, some degree
of protection, or even paternalism, may be justified in dealing with a
mentally disabled individual who wishes to place himself in direct
danger, because the applicant or employee may not be decisionally
competent. In such situations an individualized, scientific assessment
of risk to the individual appears to. have ample justification. The same
justification does not correlate to the physically disabled whose mental
faculties are fully intact. Hence, a divided approach to the two topics
may prove more beneficial to both groups by more effectively guarding
their civil rights while doing much to disassociate physical disability
and incompetence.225
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 467, 468 (1996) (discussing the complex
nature of positive law in contemporary society and arguing that law, in addition to
a coercive and constitutive function, also carries a teaching function).
224. Mental disability, for purposes of this proposal, should be understood as
limited to those conditions affecting brain function in such a way as to impair a
covered individual's judgment. Correspondingly, physical disability, for purposes
of this 'proposal would include the remaining conditions which do not impair a
covered individual's judgment.
225. Alternatively, an approach which provides for an individualized risk
assessment where a mental disability is claimed, while excluding such an inquiry
for physical disabilities, might be accomplished through an amendment to the ADA.
Such an approach would be consistent, by analogy, with the majority of
jurisprudence examining whether the ADA requires that equal benefits be provided
to mental and physical disabilities. See Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 172
(4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the ADA does not require equal levels of benefits
for the mentally and physically disabled); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d
601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that discrimination between mental and physical
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2. Invalidating Paternalism Disguised as Protection
The history of sex discrimination discussed previously evidences
that legislative enactments and employment policies disguised as
"protection" serve only to reinforce and entrench inequality. It is no
less discriminatory to deny a disabled individual the right to make an
informed decision to put himself in danger, regardless of the medical
certainty of danger, than it is to deny an entire class of women the
same right based on generalized or stereotypical assumptions.
Echazabal essentially sanctioned the very paternalistic treatment
deemed unlawful with respect to women with the caveat that the
adverse employment decision must be based on an individualized
inquiry that relies on the best available medical evidence. This
hearkens back to the not so distant past when the disabled were
robbed of their autonomy by trained experts who made decisions
regarding their potential to become productive citizens and, thus, their
societal inclusion.2 6 The EEOC correctly stated the proper purpose
of the ADA when they interpreted Congress's intent as "trying to get
at refusals to give an even break to classes of disabled people, while
claiming to act for their own good in reliance on untested and
pretextual stereotypes. 227 In taking the position that demonstrable
evidence applied to an individual is sufficient to excuse denying him
the autonomy granted to other protected groups, the EEOC erred.
A civil rights enactment prohibiting disability discrimination in
the workplace should comport with the approach taken with respect
to sex discrimination and forbid the paternalistic denial of
autonomous decisionmaking under the guise of workplace safety.
Thus, qualification or other "workplace safety" standards that
discriminate on the basis of disability should be deemed
presumptively invalid when the risk being addressed affects only the
physically disabled applicant or employee. The Title VII sex
discrimination cases discussed in previous sections of this note
demonstrate the inappropriateness of using Title VII as a vehicle for
implementing paternalistic workplace safety policies. 228  The
disabilities is not prohibited under Title I of ADA), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093,
119 S. Ct. 850 (1999); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019
(6th Cir. 1997) (same), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998); EEOC
v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); but see Johnson v.
K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035 (1 th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the denial of a long-
term disability benefit on the express ground that the claimant is mentally disabled
constituted discrimination prohibited by the ADA unless the ADA's safe harbor
provision exempts such discrimination from liability).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
227. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 74, 122 S. Ct. 2045,2047
(2002).
228. See also, Befort, supra note 181, at 45-46.
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arguments for safety-based qualification standards in the context of
the fetal-protection policy examined in Johnson Controls might at
least be rationalized as protecting something other than the woman
herself, i.e. a potential fetus. Indeed, the possibility of liability, and
even considerations of morality, appear greater in that context than
they do when a disabled individual knowingly consents to put only
himself in danger. However, as the Echazabal Court clearly stated,
the purpose of Title VII is to ban discrimination based on the broad
category of gender.229 In the sex discrimination context, this mandate
entitles the woman to evaluate the potential risks and decide for
herself whether or not to seek possibly dangerous employment.
Likewise, the purpose of a disability civil rights enactment should
be to ban discrimination on the basis of disability, and not to regulate
workplace safety. Congress set up a separate federal statutory
scheme, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, for the latter
21purpose. 30 Qualification standards affecting the disabled will require
an accommodation of these two enactments and their respective goals
of curbing discrimination and ensuring a safe work environment.
This can be appropriately accomplished by leaving the question of
workplace safety to the agency created for that purpose: OSHA.
Disability-based qualification standards that serve to implement a
safety policy potentially exceeding OSHA requirements should not
receive automatic approval by the courts. If OSHA requirements
mandate disability-based qualification standards, then, consistent with
the approach taken with respect to sex-based workplace safety
standards, courts should closely examine the disability-based
qualification standard and the possibility of less discriminatory
alternatives. In sum, qualification or safety standards that
discriminate on the basis of disability should receive the same
heightened judicial scrutiny afforded to sex-specific policies.
3. Granting Equality Absent an Economic Analysis or
Justification
Granting equality is rarely the most economically efficient
alternative. Nearly every antidiscrimination mandate imaginable
imposes significant identifiable and demonstrable costs on
employers."' Accommodations for pregnancy, for example, present
229. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 86 n.5, 122 S. Ct. at 2053 n.5.
230. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 651 etseq. (2000).
231. Professor Christine Jolls, inAntidiscrimination andAccommodation, notes
that antidiscrimination mandates applying to race and sex - under both a disparate
impact as well as disparate treatment analysis - impose specific demonstrable
costs on employers in a manner analogous to the ADA's accommodation mandate.
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a significant economic burden. The Johnson Controls Court
recognized as much when it declared, "Indeed, in passing the
[Pregnancy Discrimination Act], Congress considered at length the
considerable cost of providing equal treatment of pregnancy and
related conditions, but made the 'decision to forbid special treatment
of pregnancy despite the social costs associated therewith."'232 The
Supreme Court has clearly stated that "[t]he extra cost of employing
members of one sex ... does not provide an affirmative Title VII
defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire members of that
gender., 233 However, the current version of the ADA clings to
economic considerations of relative cost and benefit that are deemed
largely irrelevant in the sex discrimination context.
A statute addressing disability discrimination in the workplace
that leaves the rights provided open to considerations of relative cost
and benefit, as does the ADA, cannot be recognized as a
revolutionary civil rights enactment or, for that matter, a civil rights
enactment at all. A sincere antidiscrimination statute should clearly
recognize the economic burden associated with its provisions and
refuse to allow economic considerations to dilute its pronouncements.
Equality being the goal, not economy, requires abandoning ill-defined
notions of undue hardship and reasonableness.
It is frequently assumed that the economic burden associated with
accommodating disabilities is far greater than the economic burden
associated with Title VII compliance. Whether or not this assessment
comports with reality,234 numerous scholars have proposed creative
Jolls, supra note 14, at 652-66.
232. Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 210, 111 S. Ct.
1196, 1209 (1991); citing Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and
Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1085 n.14, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3500
n.14 (1983) (opinion of Marshall, J.), Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
233. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210, 111 S. Ct. at 1209, citing City of Los
Angeles Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18
n. 32, 98 S. Ct. 1370, 1379-80 n.32 (1978).
234. See Frederick C. Collignon, The Role of Reasonable Accommodation in
Employing Disabled Persons in Private Industry, in Disability and the Labor Market
196, 231-38 (Monroe Berkowitz & M. Anne Hill eds., 2d ed. 1989) (arguing that
economists' negative theorizing about the costly effects of accommodation often do
not consider the actual experiences ofbusinesses); Peter D. Blanck, Communicating
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Transcending Compliance: 1996 Follow-Up
Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co., Annenberg Washington Program Report (1996)
at 42-43 (demonstrating that the low direct costs of accommodations for employees
with disabilities has been shown to produce substantial economic benefits to
companies, in terms of increased work productivity, injury prevention, reduced
workers' compensation costs, and workplace effectiveness and efficiency); Francine
S. Hall & Elizabeth L. Hall, The ADA: Going Beyond the Law, 8 Acad. Mgmt.
Executives 17, 17-26 (1994) (noting that one of the indirect benefits of following
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funding schemes, to be implemented by businesses or the federal
government, which could help offset the cost of making reasonable
accommodations.235 Given the aggregate societal savings that could
be realized by these funded accommodations, such a scheme may
approach paying for itself.236 Abandoning the undue hardship
provision in favor of such a funding program would go considerably
farther toward providing a comprehensive "national mandate" 237 for
the elimination of disability discrimination than the now diluted
version of the ADA.
Nonetheless, the largely ignored alternative-permanent societal
division based on immutable characteristics-is, in the view of this
author, considerably more costly.
Its price is the admission that our founding story, with its myths
about brotherhood [and] equality ... is just that: a collection of
myths. We will then confront the somber realization that, as a
the ADA occurs when a corporation acknowledges reality and supports people with
special needs, thereby gaining a strategic and competitive advantage); President's
Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, Job Accommodation
Network (JAN) Reports (Oct.-Dec. 1994) (Washington, D.C., 1994) (JAN reports
that for every dollar invested in an effective accommodation, companies sampled
realized an average of $50 in benefits.).
235. For a discussion of public funding for reasonable accommodations see
Scott A. Moss and Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public Funding for Disability
Accommodations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the
Disabilities of the ADA, 33 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 197 (1998). Such a scheme
would remove a major incentive for employers to discriminate: the cost of
accommodating the disabled employee. See also, Epstein, supra note 126, at 493
(concluding that a system of federal grants should replace the ADA so that
Congress pays for the accommodations that it wants employers to make); Bonnie
O'Day, Economics versus Civil Rights, 3 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 291, 301
(1994) ("Shifting some of the burden of accommodation from employers to the
taxpayer would benefit individuals with disabilities because employers would be
more likely to hire them if they were not responsible for the full cost of providing
the necessary accommodations.").
236. For example, one report estimates that for every one million disabled
people employed, there would be as much as a $21.2 billion annual increase in
earned income, a $2.1 billion decrease in means-tested cash income payments, a
$286 million annual decrease in the use of food stamps, a $1.8 billion decrease in
Supplemental Security Income payments, 284,000 fewer people using Medicaid and
166,000 fewer people using Medicare. See People with Disabilities Show What
They Can Do, Human Resources, June 1998, at 144 (citing Rutgers University
economist Douglas Kruse). See also, Nish, The JWOD Program: Providing Cost
Savings to the Federal Government by Employing People with Disabilities (Feb. 6,
1998) (listing survey results and reporting that the federal government saved
$1,963,206 over the course of the study by employing 270 people with disabilities);
Taxpayer Return Study California Department of Rehabilitation Mental Health
Cooperative Programs (Oct. 1995) (finding that for every disabled person
employed, California taxpayers saved an average of $629 per month in costs).
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2002).
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people, we are not serious about equality, that we embrace
inequality and status so long as they benefit us, and that in these
respects we are no different from the many Western and
nonwestern nations that are built on, and willingly accept,
permanent, ineradicable divisions of race, sex, and caste. 3
B. Aligning the ADA with Traditional Antidiscrimination Principles
In the interest of examining all possible explanations for and
potential legislative reactions to the Echazabal decision, this section will
explore an even more fundamental theoretical difficulty that, it may be
argued, is built into the ADA. Paternalistic interpretations of the ADA
may be attributed to the theoretical perplexities that necessarily
accompany any pronouncement of "civil rights" whose implementation
ultimately requires resort to accommodation mandates. Indeed, it is one
thing to argue, as Professor Jolls effectively does, that both Title VII and
the ADA may be characterized as "accommodationist" laws in the sense
that they both require employers to incur special and demonstrable costs
in response to the distinctive needs (as measured against existing market
structures) of particular, identifiable demographic groups of employees.
Obviously, each statute imposes this requirement in circumstances in
which the employer has no intention of treating the group in question
differently on the basis of group membership or "discriminating against"
the group in the canonical sense.239 Yet, it is an entirely separate
proposition that, as such, accommodationist provisions are immune from
attack on the ground that they extend beyond the proper scope of
antidiscrimination - and, indeed, civil rights - law. Professor Jolls
does not attempt to offer any clear, normative guidance on the propriety
of laws that penalize rational, profit-maximizing behavior. Hence,
Professor Jolls's enlightening research exposes a central lingering
question: practical similarities notwithstanding, do accommodation
mandates extend beyond the proper scope of civil rights law?
1. Theoretical Difficulties and the Proper Scope of
Antidiscrimination Law
One scholar defends the "conventional wisdom" called into question
by Professor Jolls's research by characterizing the concepts of
238. Richard Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises: When
Equality Doesn't Compute, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 579, 586 (1989); see also, Bonnie
O'Day, Economics versus Civil Rights, 3 Comell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 291, 301
(1994) ("To provide the societally optimal level of accommodations to individuals
with disabilities, the costs and benefits to society as a whole must inform the
accommodation analysis.").
239. See Jolls, supra note 14, at 648; see also, supra text accompanying notes
188-198.
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antidiscrimination and accommodation as "a useful shorthand
terminology for civil rights policies at opposite ends of a continuum."2"
Professor Verkerke, in "Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and
Accommodation," further asserts that the exercise of drawing
meaningful distinctions among legal rules that fall on different points
along this continuum is not merely possible; it is essential to a coherent
understanding of civil rights law. Indeed, as another scholar critiquing
Professor Jolls's thesis argues, "Professor Jolls aligns the ADA with non-
core cases of discrimination under Title VII, which threatens to impair
both the growth and the strength of the accommodation model."" In
order to fully understand this characterization, the following sections will
discuss the major tenets of Professor Verkerke's argument, as well as the
unintended consequences, briefly alluded to by Professor Verkerke, that
may flow from expansively drafted accommodationist laws such as the
ADA.
a. The Civil Rights Continuum
Professor Verkerke begins by defining the outer boundaries of his
civil rights continuum, placing the principle of negative equality at
one end of the spectrum. According to Verkerke's formulation,
negative equality "bars specific grounds for employment decisions
that the law deems illegitimate but otherwise leaves business free to
manage their affairs as they wish." '242 Positive equality, under which
"firms have an affirmative obligation to use merit-based criteria to
make employment decisions," finds placement at the midpoint of the
continuum. 2 3 Rooted in meritocractic ideals, the principle ofpositive
equality would allow firms to discharge a disabled employee who
produced less or costed more than other workers.2 " Finally, at the
end of the continuum directly opposite negative equality lies
accommodation. Contrasting accommodation with other equality
principles represented on the continuum, Verkerke states, "an
'accommodation' mandate requires employers to make costly
exceptions to their merit-based criteria in order to increase
employment opportunities for individuals who would otherwise be
excluded... These additional costs would ordinarily justify a firm's
decision to discharge this employee, but the legal requirement of
240. Verkerke, supra note 15, at 1419.
241. Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of
Workplace Disabilities, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1197, 1201 (2003) (characterizing
antidiscrimination and accommodation mandates as respectively embodying "soft"
and "hard preferences") [hereinafter "Schwab & Willborn"].
242. Verkerke, supra note 15, at 1389.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1390.
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reasonable accommodation obliges the employer to make an
exception to its normal criteria and incur some cost or loss of
productivity as a result." '245 Verkerke notes that if a costless change
in work procedures would allow an applicant or employee to perform
the job as effectively as others, he would need only to invoke the
principle of positive equality rather than seek an accommodation.246
In such circumstances, the employer could not feasibly defend, on
meritocractic grounds, the decision to discharge him.247  Thus,
Professor Verkerke concludes that the true distinction between
accommodation and positive equality refers to "the magnitude of any
costs associated with permitting an individual with a disability to
perform a particularjob. '248 If those costs are nonexistent, according
to Verkerke, the norm of positive equality provides sufficient
protection. Yet, as those costs increase, the case moves along the
continuum into the domain of accommodation.249
b. Divergence Along the Continuum
1) Title VII and the Continuum
Addressing Professor Jolls's statutory arguments, Professor
Verkerke places Title VII disparate treatment liability in the category
of negative equality norms, because it prohibits firms from
considering certain protected traits when making important
employment decisions.250  Alternatively, the doctrine of disparate
impact liability is further subdivided into three distinct versions: "(1)
an 'objective theory' for uncovering pretextual discrimination, (2) a
concerted effort to attack any 'arbitrary barriers' to the advancement
of protected group members, and (3) a demanding requirement that
any exclusionary employment practices be genuinely 'necessary' in
order to justify them. '25 The first two categories essentially aim to
combat pretextual discrimination, thus aligning most closely with
negative equality.25 2  However, the third category - the strict
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1390-91.
249. Id. at 1391.
250. Id. at 1396.
251. Id. at 1397. Professor Verkerke finds support for this subdivision in
various passages of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S. Ct. 849,
854 (1971), as well as subsequent case law. See id; citing George Rutherglen,
Employment Discrimination Law: Visions of Equality in Theory and Doctrine 70-
73 (2001).
252. Verkerke, supra note 15, at 1399. With respect to the second category, this
is because "an employer may continue to use a practice after offering persuasive
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requirement that any exclusionary employment practices be genuinely
"necessary" in order to be justified - understandably filters out at
least some meritocractic standards and, thus, requires the employer to
incur some expenses or lost productivity in order to avoid the
practice's exclusionary effect.23 Hence, the "vanishingly small"
number of disparate impact cases falling into this third category do
impose something of an implicit accommodation requirement.2 4 Yet,
Professor Verkerke argues, "the genuine overlap between traditional
antidiscrimination statutes and accommodation requirements is
probably small enough to be disregarded for many purposes.""25
2) Apples and Pineapples?
Professor Verkerke's arguments rely, in large part, on the costs
associated with accommodation mandates and the degree in which
they differ from those generally associated with more traditional
antidiscrimination mandates. He notes that, from a practical
standpoint, the vast majority of cases brought under Title VH are
almost exclusively concerned with negative equality, with a small
number of cases seeking to enforce the norm of positive equality, and
an even smaller number seeking to impose the limited form of
accommodation mandate outlined above.2' 6 Yet, the ADA noticeably
transcends disparate impact liability doctrine, and cost is just one
symptom of the theoretical divide.
The doctrine of disparate impact liability is frequently referred to
as disparate impact theory, partly because it owes its original creation
to judicial decisions that expanded the scope of liability that an
employer may face under Title VII.257 The judicially-created
"disparate impact" category was later codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k), in response to the Supreme Court's narrower interpretation of
the doctrine in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.258 Yet, this
codification failed to include an explicit duty of accommodation;
rather, it quite simply aimed at preventing facially neutral policies
that disproportionately disadvantaged a protected class of persons
evidence that it serves a legitimate business objective." Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1402-03.
255. Id. at 1403.
256. Id. at 1404.
257. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 405 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971), represents
the origin of disparate impact theory. There the Court stated that the "absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability." Id. at 432, 91 S. Ct. at 854.
258. 490U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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unless the challenged policy could be justified on the grounds that it
was job related and consistent with business necessity.259 While
rare expansive interpretations of the doctrine do exist, given the
narrow statutory formulation of disparate impact liability, future
enlargement of the doctrine to encompass accommodation
requirements rests on the willingness of courts to broaden Title VII
coverage to include such situations. The "vanishingly small"'26
number of cases receiving such treatment is precisely a reflection of
the courts' hesitation to do so.
In contrast to Title VII, the ADA's accommodation requirements
are statutory, overt, and explicit. Indeed, in some circumstances,
the ADA requires employers to accommodate individuals with
disabilities even though they cost more to employ than others or are
able to produce less.2 ' But more fundamentally, the language of the
statute declares that covered employers must accommodate
otherwise qualified individuals with a disability, and (excluding the
possibility of an available defense) a failure to do so carries with it
the potential for litigation and liability. Accordingly, as argued in
previous sections of this note, the ADA's undue hardship provision
(and the requirement that any accommodations provided be
"reasonable") may not be defensible solely on grounds of the costs
associated with their provision. However, the undue hardship
provision may be defended on the ground that, with the exception
of Title VII's diluted requirement of religious accommodations, 262
no other antidiscrimination law has ever explicitly mandated
accommodation, regardless of the infrequent instances in which
disparate impact (and even more exceptionally, disparate treatment)
liability have imposed similar costs. Thus, the models of
antidiscrimination embodied in the two Acts do remain distinct.
Ultimately, rather than apples and oranges, the ADA's reasonable
259. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
260. Verkerke, supra note 15, at 1402-03.
261. See Schwab & Willbom, supra note 241, at 1204.
262. In the context of Title VII discrimination on the basis of religion, any
accommodation that requires the employer to incur more than a slight cost would
likely constitute an undue hardship. See supra text accompanying notes 44 & 186;
see also, Trans. World Airlines, Inc. v Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 S. Ct. 2264
(1977); Ansonia Rd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69, 107 S. Ct. 367, 372
(1986). Hence, some commentators argue that there is no substantive value
associated with the religious accommodation requirement. See, e.g., Sonny Franklin
Miller, Note-Religious Accommodation Under Title VII: The Burdenless Burden,
22 J. Corp. L. 789, 799 (1997) (observing that as a result of the de minimis
standard, the Act only provides workers in need of religious accommodation with
"hypothetical protection"); Symposium, Religion in the Workplace, 4 Employee
Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 87, 98 (2000) (comments of Judge Michael W. McConnell)
(stating that "the Supreme Court's decisions in Hardison and Philbrook have made
mincemeat of the congressional intention in Title VII").
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accommodation provision and Title VII disparate impact liability
have about as much in common as apples and pineapples: while
sounding vaguely similar, they nonetheless owe their existence to
entirely separate theoretical trees.263
Nonetheless, the meaning of the ADA's requirement of
reasonable accommodation, along with the definitional question of
who counts as disabled, are two of the most important and unsettled
questions posed by the statute.2" Yet, as Professor Verkerke
demonstrates, expansively written accommodationist laws have a
tendency to create potentially troublesome and likely unintended
consequences that seriously impact both of these concepts.
c. Judicial Reactions and Unintended Consequences
As noted by countless commentators, judicial interpretation of the
ADA has significantly limited the coverage and scope of the statute
in a variety of meaningful ways.265 As Professor Verkerke observes,
"it is difficult to deny that the judicial reaction to the ADA has been
considerably more skeptical and resistant than it has been toward
more traditional civil rights legislation. ' 266  Professor Verkerke
attributes this judicial skepticism, in part, to the location of the
ADA's accommodation requirements at the outermost end of the civil
rights continuum and the tendency of popular resistance to increase
as statutes progress toward this extreme. 267 Given its overt (and
consequently controversial) accommodation requirements, courts
appear cautious about extending those duties too far. As such, the
contours of the ADA are subject to continual examination and
modification, which is frequently generalized as unfavorable to ADA
plaintiffs. The meaning of the terms "reasonable accommodation"
and "qualified individual with a disability" are the two primary areas
263. See Cubanski v. Heckler, 794 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)(similarly characterizing concepts
unrelated to the subject of this paper as "apples and pineapples"), vacated as moot
sub nom., Bowen v. Kizer, 485 U.S. 386, 108 S. Ct. 1200 (1988).
264. See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 241, at 1201.
265. See, e.g., Diane L. Kimberlin and Linda 0. Headley, ADA Overview and
Update: What has the Supreme Court Done to Disability Law?, 19 Rev. Litig. 579,
581-82 (2000) ("Court decisions since the ADA's passage.., have created the
perception that employers will usually prevail in ADA lawsuits and that employees
have little chance of successfully establishing disability discrimination."); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. &
Lab. L. 1 (2000) (detailing both a judicial and popular backlash against the broad
endorsement of disability rights represented by the ADA).
266. Verkerke, supra note 15, at 1418.
267. Id.
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in which this phenomenon is readily apparent. Yet, judicial
skepticism and continuous modification, particularly in areas which
trigger the substantive protections of the Act, may be responsible for
producing some very serious (and largely negative) consequences for
persons who might have otherwise found protection under a more
traditional antidiscrimination statute addressing disability
discrimination.
With respect to the latter definitional category- that of "qualified
individual with a disability" - for example, consider the following
hypothetical illustration: Applicant A and her twin B are alike in all
respects. Both were born with a congenital disorder (birth defect)
known as Syndactyly (joined phalanges), which affects the
hypothetical applicants' hands in a manner that renders them unable
to perform the physical motions required to twist the circular knobs
used on most doors. Both applicants plan to apply for ajob with a
large nation-wide investment banking firm following their graduation
from college. Prior to their application, the applicants learn of the
firm's exclusive use of circular door knobs. Anticipating the
difficulties these structural obstacles will present, applicant A obtains
a prosthetic device designed to give her individual control over at
least three fingers by using her original nerve pathways. 6 While the
use of this device provides applicant A with increased mobility and
access, the artificial nature of the device renders her disability
significantly more noticeable than before. Applicant B does not
obtain the device. As planned, both apply for the job.
During the interview, Applicant B informs the hiring partner of
her disability and her need for accommodations. She explains that
such accommodations may be made by replacing each of the firm's
270 doorknobs with straight-handle knobs for easier access.
Applicant A does not have to inform the hiring partner of her
disability; her prosthetic device is immediately noticed when she
introduces herself. Applicant A explains that the prosthetic hand is
her response to a congenital birth defect which makes it impossible
for her to open doors with circular knobs.
Following the interview, each applicant receives a letter.
Applicant B is offered a position pending completed installation of
the structural (door knob) accommodations. Applicant A is told that,
despite her excellent qualifications, the firm cannot extend her an
offer. Upon further inquiry, Applicant A learns that the hiring partner
is primarily concerned about the unpleasant appearance of her
prosthetic device and its potential to deter future clients. Believing
268. See, e.g., Associated Press, New Artificial Hand Allows Finger
Movement, CNN Interactive, 2 (1998), at
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9806/10/artificial.hand/ (last accessed 08/24/03).
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this to be a discriminatory employment decision made on the basis of
her disability, Applicant A begins researching the ADA's recent
judicial interpretations examining the definition of disability. She
uncovers case law suggesting that, had she refused to take steps to
integrate herself into the firm of her choosing, she would have
qualified for protection under the ADA. But because of her actions,
she has removed herself from the scope of legal protection afforded
to individuals with a disability. 69
The point of this exercise is to expose the unintended
consequences of expansively written accommodationist laws whose
provisions appear to provoke both skepticism and caution on the part
of judges charged with interpreting their meaning. Yet, disability
case law and equality doctrines notwithstanding, what should
determine who is deserving of protection under a civil rights law
forbidding discriminatory decisionmaking on the basis of disability?
At the risk of oversimplifying the issues at stake, it cannot be ignored
269. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 2139
(1999) (finding visually impaired twin female pilots not disabled under the ADA
because, with their eyeglasses and contact lenses, they were not substantially limited
in a major life activity); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 119 S. Ct.
2133 (1999) (relying on Sutton to hold that the plaintiff, whose blood pressure
without medication was approximately 250/160, in his medicated state was not
substantially limited in a major life activity and, therefore, was not a person with a
disability); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999)
(holding that a person with monocular vision was not necessarily disabled). The
effect of the "Sutton trilogy" is that many individuals suffering from physical or
mental impairments and chronic diseases that can be corrected through the use of
medication, artificial aids, or prosthetic devices are not extended the protections of
the ADA in the workplace. The Sutton Court had to initially decide whether
mitigating measures, such as corrective lenses and prescription medication, should
be considered when determining whether particular conditions substantially limit
major life activities. The Court noted that a regulation promulgated by the EEOC
pursuant to its administrative authority to interpret the employment discrimination
provisions of the ADA expressly stated that "[t]he determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited... must be made on a case by case basis, without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480, 119 S. Ct. at 2145 (quoting, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20)).
The Department of Justice had issued a similar regulation. Id. (citing, 28 C.F.R.
app. A § 35.104 (2002)). Justice O'Connor, writing for the seven-Justice majority,
stated that "it is apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct for, or
mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures-both
positive and negative-must be taken into account when judging whether that
person is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity." Id. at 482, 199 S. Ct. at
2146. Hence, the majority concluded that the EEOC regulation constituted an
impermissible interpretation of the Act's scope. Id. The Court also rejected the
claim that an employee denied an opportunity on the basis of a physical impairment
was "regarded as" disabled unless the employer subjectively assessed the
impairment as substantially limiting major life activities. See id. at 489, 119 S. Ct.
at 2149.
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that having in place a simple and clear mandate, grounded in
principles of positive equality, that forbids discrimination on the basis
of disability would protect applicant A from an adverse employment
decision which could be made solely on the basis of her disability.
Against this theoretical backdrop, the hypothetical hiring partner's
decision could not feasibly be justified by resort to meritocractic
standards and ideals. But as it stands, the presently diluted version of
the ADA gives no such protection.
One could clearly argue that the employment decisions illustrated
in this hypothetical result from the courts' failure to properly interpret
the ADA and that the judicial decisions relied on in support of the
outcome of the hypothetical were erroneous.27° Another argument
posits that the unintended consequences of broadening the scope of
protection under the statute may be the "backlash" that is being
experienced as courts struggle with the difficulties inherent in a law
so expansively written and so seemingly contradictory to traditional
principles of antidiscrimination law. This "backlash" may serve to
deny protection to those who, under a traditional view of civil rights
law, would find refuge.
The Echazabal decision may likewise be characterized as a
judicial reaction to the unclear and contradictory nature of the statute.
Here, I pause carefully for all of the reasons outlined in previous
sections of this note. That workplace accommodations are rightly the
legal duty and responsibility of the employer implies an element of
paternalism. Rather than simply protecting individuals from
employment decisions unrelated to merit under a regime of positive
equality, accommodationist laws deliberately interfere with an
employer's freedom of choice, contrary to his or her express wishes,
and under the guise of acting for the disabled worker's own good.27'
Paternalistic interpretations of the ADA, such as Echazabal, may be
attributed to this reality.
Furthermore, the judicial "backlash" to the ADA, which is
arguably an equally powerful explanation for the Echazabal decision,
can be characterized as a reaction to statutes that align closely with
accommodation mandates on the civil rights continuum.272 In other
words, despite the similar results that antidiscrimination and
accommodation mandates may effect, there does remain a
fundamental difference between the antidiscrimination mandate
270. See, e.g., Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability", 86
Va. L. Rev. 397, 400 (2000).
271. See supra text accompanying note 84.
272. Judicial narrowing of Title VII's explicit accommodation duty where
religion is concerned provides further support for this argument. See supra notes 44,
186 & 262, and the sources cited therein.
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embodied in Title VII and the overt accommodationist requirements
of the ADA: a difference of principle and not merely of cost.
Thus, the Act creates confusion. Its provisions are popularly
viewed, not as antidiscrimination, but as a framework of special or
preferential treatment. Since it is antidiscrimination principles which
continue to provide the theoretical rootstock of civil rights law, the
confusion created can be best explained as a reaction to the failure of
antidiscrimination principles to effectively "accommodate" explicit
accommodation mandates, regardless of how frequently the two must
coexist.
2. An Alternative Revision
Given this reality, it remains to ask this question: How may
antidiscrimination law effectively respond to the complex problems
presented by disability discrimination in the workplace? As alluded
to previously, one potential response is seductively simple and
precisely opposite the reform advocated in part A of this section.
Rather than expand and rewrite the definition of disability, this
alternative revision would excise the ADA's accommodationist
provisions (i.e., the requirement to provide reasonable
accommodations, the accommodationist definition of disability, and,
correspondingly, the undue hardship provision). The ADA's
antidiscrimination mandate would then more closely approximate
previous antidiscrimination statutes enacted according to models of
positive equality, by forbidding discriminatory decisionmaking on the
basis of disability when such decisions do not reflect the individual
ability or merit of the employee.
The results of this change appear undeniably harsh. Indeed,
employees who require costly accommodations that outweigh
individual potential for profit would likely fall outside the definition
of "qualified individual with a disability," thus, failing the threshold
test for protection under the statute. Ultimately, however, the harm
associated with narrowing the scope of the statute must be balanced
against the reality of, and the fear of future, backlash against the
accommodationist provisions of the ADA. Likewise, the benefit of
this revision is that it would provide a relatively clear framework for
viewing the goal of the law (i.e., to combat discrimination unrelated
to merit), and this goal coincides naturally with what are popularly
viewed as the "traditional" functions of antidiscrimination law.
Hence, the statute, as revised, would provide greater justification for
treating the members of its protected class in a manner similar to
those afforded protection under Title VII. Decidedly less
controversial in nature (at least among persons supporting the goals
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of positive equality), such a revision would move society closer to the
goal of achieving equality of opportunity for disabled individuals in
the workplace than does the now diluted and judicially-crippled
version of the ADA.
CONCLUSION
The Americans with Disabilities Act has fallen short of
accomplishing the enticing vision of equality of opportunity for
disabled Americans in the workplace which was proclaimed at its
passage. The current version of the ADA and its judicial
interpretations pose grave obstacles to achieving equal civil rights
for the disabled. An antidiscrimination statute operating from the
assumption that the class of persons seeking protection is
findamentally unequal will generally only foster mild societal
change that can appropriately be characterized as toleration.
Toleration falls decisively short of the civil rights rhetoric which
accompanied the passage of the ADA. The current version of the
Act also contributes to the charitable framework through which it
is often, perhaps unconsciously, viewed. Yet, the danger of viewing
prohibitions on disability discrimination as a form of charity is
acute; it goes to the very essence of our societal understanding of
the proper treatment ofbiological "difference." Our response to this
danger defines our commitment to equality and everything that it
entails. Ignorance of this danger in a representative democracy such
as ours represents nothing less than a national choice to willingly
accept "pernianent, ineradicable divisions""' which are kept firmly
in place by formidable external exclusionary practices. These
practices serve to eliminate disabled persons from the landscape of
those afforded equality of opportunity just as a staircase bars the
entry of a person in a wheelchair.
It is natural to blame the ADA's shortcomings on the failure of
the courts to properly interpret the law. A more fundamental
problem, however, lies in the ADA itself--"in the seemingly
conflicting premises underlying the Act and the Act's failure to
straightforwardly present its objectives. ' 274 The assumption that
both disabled Americans and women alike "are in danger of hurting
themselves and that their very bodies are incompatible with safe and
efficient work is more than a coincidental similarity. '275 Because of
273. Richard Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises: When
Equality Doesn't Compute, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 579, 586 (1989).
274. Tucker, supra note 141, at 339.
275. Collette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination:
Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 Geo.
[Vol. 63
the similarities of the issues faced, an effective revision of the ADA
should incorporate the lessons learned over the course of the
women's equality movement. Particularly, the ADA should
sincerely attack the most pervasive form of discrimination
traditionally endured by both women and disabled individuals:
paternalistic workplace policies disguised as protection that severely
limit the ability of disabled persons to realize independence and
equality. Given the divergent approach taken with respect to
paternalistic policies targeting or affecting women, it must be
considered whether denying the same autonomy to the disabled is
justifiable in civil rights terms. With respect to sex discrimination,
the empowerment of occupational choice is viewed as a key to
achieving independence. Yet, a unanimous Supreme Court has
denied precisely this choice to applicants or employees protected
under the ADA. If Congress is serious about emancipating disabled
individuals from an exclusionary workplace, then major revisions
are necessary.
The revisions offered herein represent admittedly opposite and
mutually exclusive extremes on the spectrum of potential ADA
reforms. Ultimately, any legislative revision of the ADA must
forcefully demonstrate that freedom from discrimination in this
context is, indeed, a civil right not unlike those afforded to members
of other protected classes. Given the judicial resistance to
accommodationist laws and the conflict created when "traditional"
civil rights doctrine and explicit accommodation mandates are
forced to coexist, something may have to give. The proposals
presented in this note provide two distinct alternatives to remedy the
presently crippled version of the ADA.
In the meantime, in light of the now diluted version of the ADA,
the Supreme Court in Echazabal appears to have reached the correct
result. The discord created by the melding of notions of inherent
inferiority, and/or mandated accommodations, with the rhetoric of
previous civil rights enactments has significantly paralyzed the
ADA in a way that particularly lends itself to a paternalistic
interpretation that is precluded in the Title VII context.
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the day will come when disabled
Americans may realize the emancipatory potential of a sincere and
effective civil rights enactment that would transcend the historical
emphasis on paternalism and protection and pave the way for a
reconstituted perception of biological variance in the workplace. To
move toward that day, two approaches are offered: Either
strengthen, clarify, and mandate the duty of accommodation
L.J. 193,229 (1993).
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consistent with granting full and equal civil rights to the disabled,
or limit those who will be protected to those who can be within the
framework of traditional antidiscrimination principles. Only time
will tell which proves more effective. Nonetheless, given the
colossal failure of the statute as a litigation tool, the very reasons
that led an overwhelming majority of Congress to pass the
Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 require an immediate and
thorough reexamination and revision as a top legislative priority.
Alexandra G. White**
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